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Abstract 
 
          This thesis aims at shedding light on the withdrawal of the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia,  
 
the UAE and Bahrain from Doha from 5 march 2014 till 16 November, reportedly as a sign of  
 
protest against Qatar, and its dynamic foreign policy in favor of political Islam notably following 
 
the coming to power of President Mohammad Morsi in Egypt, and the fall of some Arab leaders 
 
such as Zine Al Abidine of Tunisia, and Colonel Muammar Al Gaddafi of Libya as part of the 
 
Arab Spring Revolutions, which started by the beginning of 2011. 
 
          The thesis attempts to examine the impact of the ambassadors' withdrawal from Doha on 
 
the Gulf Cooperation Council, and its prospects for a greater unification to crown the integration 
 
project initiated in 1981 with the creation of the GCC. 
 
          The thesis is made up of six chapters which trace the genesis of the crisis, provide a 
 
historical and conceptual background of the GCC to better understand this regional organization, 
 
and try to gauge the damage caused by this incident on the GCC, and to determine the aspects 
 
affected by this move as well. 
 
          The thesis has used a qualitative method based on personal interviews to get in-depth  
 
explanations for this dispute which has apparently jolted this young integration project, and has 
 
aroused much doubt about the cohesion and solidity of the organization, and its ability in coping 
 
with new developments and events. 
 
           The paper ends up with a conclusion which provides an answer to the main question  
 
v 
raised by the thesis namely the impact of the ambassadors' withdrawal on the GCC on the basis 
 
of the results stemming from the interviews, and gives hints about the future prospects of this  
 
regional integration project following a period which lasted only eight months, but it was very  
 
hard for the GCC which had to strive to settle the dispute. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
Introduction 
 
          The record of regional integration projects is full of successful and painful experiences  
 
which could not resist the problems they met  on their way (Abdul Khaliq Abdulla).These  
 
difficulties affected some organizations which could not surpass these circumstances, and gave  
 
up in the mid-way, while others had the ability to overcome all types of obstacles, and achieved  
 
the objectives they had set at their inception including the European Union which stands as a  
 
telling evidence of cohesion and solidity. 
 
          The Gulf Cooperation Council, founded in 1981 in Abu Dhabi, has witnessed troubled 
 
circumstances throughout its 33 years of existence, and has managed to cope with most of them  
 
including the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990, the US invasion of Iraq, and a host of border  
 
disputes among member states. However, the withdrawal of the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia,  
 
UAE and Bahrain seems to be the most serious problem for the GCC which has been settled after  
 
long mediation efforts made by Kuwait and Oman to end the row (Gulf news.com). 
 
Problem statement 
 
          This thesis examines the spillover effects of the withdrawal of ambassadors from Doha 
 
since the outbreak of the crisis on 5 March 2014, and the damage it has caused to the GCC  
  
during eight months of crisis including the functioning of the organization, and the different  
 
aspects affected by this unprecedented incident in the history of this regional grouping. The  
 
effects of this move, which are multi-dimensional, have been tangibly felt notably in the political  
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and economic fields which did not function well (Abdul Khaliq Abdulla), and the rift was 
 
expected to widen if the crisis was not contained by the parties at loggerheads ( Goldfischer). 
 
Purpose statement 
 
          The aim of this thesis is to explore the reasons which led to the outbreak of this dispute,  
 
but mainly to examine to what extent was the impact of this crisis on the GCC integration  
 
prospects, and the different aspects affected by this friction within the organization above all the  
 
political leg. It will shed more light on this particular period in the history of the Gulf 
 
organization which remains shadowy due to the lack of academic and specialized studies as the  
 
case is new, and has kept developing till mid-November with multiple leaders' meetings and  
 
statements meant to find a final resolution to the crisis. 
 
           Therefore, the study lays just the foundation stone for other academic studies to dig more  
 
into the crisis to unearth more evidence, and to provide further clarification. 
 
Research question 
 
          Since the beginning of the GCC row, a heated debate arose among experts and scholars  
 
about the effects of the incident on this regional integration project. The controversy gave birth  
 
to two major trends; the first tendency believes that the drift did not have an effect on the GCC  
 
simply because  this organization does not exist actually, it remains loose and imagined with no  
 
tangible effectiveness following the decrease of Iran's threat (Krieg). While the second trend  
 
claims that the row caused a friction within the organization, and hampered its integration  
 
3 
process which had already borne fruitful results in several fields, and had improved the living  
 
standard of the Gulf peoples (AbdulKhaliq).  
 
          Therefore, the main research question of this thesis is to examine to what extent the  
 
ambassadors' withdrawal affected the GCC integration prospects?. 
 
The method 
 
          The method used is a qualitative approach based on interviews with scholars and analysts,  
 
who attended a meeting held last summer by the Gulf  Research Center in Cambridge. The 
 
choice of this seminar was not accidental, it was basically meant to get different views and ideas 
 
from scholars coming from all over the GCC states and outside the organization for more in- 
 
depth answers  and analyses. The interviews will be supported by other views included in the 
 
literature review based on newspapers ,and other media news which kept covering the 
 
development of the incident over the past eight months, in addition to statements made by GCC  
 
leaders in their meetings and reconciliation efforts to end the crisis. It is worth noting, however,  
 
that specialized studies related to this issue are very scarce since the row has been going on till  
 
16 November, few days before the thesis submission which required a review of the chapters  
 
already written. 
 
The genesis of the crisis 
 
          The dispute broke out officially on March 5
th
 2014 when Saudi Arabia, the UAE and  
 
Bahrain announced the withdrawal of their ambassadors from Doha “to protect security and  
 
stability” as they said in a joint statement in which they justified the move of pulling out their  
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ambassadors by Qatar's failure to put into effect a security agreement in a given time frame,  
 
which had been previously  signed by all six GCC members on November 23, 2013 in Riyadh.  
 
The pact included: 
 
                 a security agreement and a commitment to the principles 
 
                 that ensure non-interference in the internal affairs of any 
 
                 of the GCC countries, either directly or indirectly, and not 
 
                 to support any activity that would threaten the security and 
 
                 stability of any of the GCC countries from organizations or 
 
                 individuals, including support for hostile media (CNN.com). 
 
         This move did not come from a vacuum, it was “just the straw that broke the camel's back" 
 
as stated by David Roberts in an interview with the author. The seeds of this rift go back to 
 
earlier incidents between Qatar and the other three GCC states for several reasons related to 
 
Qatar's will to get rid of the Saudi political orbit by forging its own independent foreign policy  
 
according to the same interlocutor . 
 
          In fact, a similar event, but a bilateral one, happened between Qatar and Saudi Arabia 
 
which withdrew its ambassador from Doha between 2002-2008, and the reason thought for that 
 
was the anti-Saudi coverage of Aljazeera (BBC.com). The role of Aljazeera has always been 
 
causing annoyance to these three countries, it was behind the rift between Qatar and Bahrain  
 
during the Manama protests in early 2011 where the Channel was accused of  "trying to foment  
 
unrest and undo the benefits of Bahrain's national dialogue"( Guardian.com). 
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          Aljazeera appeared, once again, as a source of discord within the GCC states during the  
 
war on Gaza in 2014 when the Abu Dhabi government was accused by the Qatari media channel  
 
of sponsoring Israel (Gulf news.com). Bilateral relations, already strained, became worse and the  
 
UAE called for apology from Doha as indicated by the same newspaper. 
 
          However, Aljazeera was not the sole reason for this unprecedented move in the GCC  
 
history, the ever mounting support of Qatar to political Islam in the region and elsewhere in the  
 
Arab world as part of the Arab Spring further fuelled the rift according to Goldfischer who  
 
stated that “the deepest immediate issue is the support of Qatar for the Muslim Brotherhood”.  
 
This opinion is shared by several scholars including David Roberts, Gerd Nonneman, Abdul 
 
khaliq Abdulla and many others, though they label it differently. 
 
          The Qatari support for Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned in Saudi Arabia and the 
 
UAE, seems to have displeased the two countries which were against any change in the region,  
 
and "perceived political Islam as a direct threat to their survival''(Goldfischer).This fear for  
 
political Islam or ''paranoia'' as termed by Andreas Krieg reached its climax when the wind of  
 
change blew in a strategic country in the region namely Egypt which remains, despite its 
 
problems ''an important umbrella for the region''(Al Sumait). The two states had to react to keep  
 
the status quo in the region and the current system in the area (Al Saqri). 
 
          In fact, this trend is backed by many scholars including Jamal Abdulla who believes that  
 
''as certain regimes watched these events, they feared political change would soon reach their  
 
shores ,and thus implemented preventative measures to immunize themselves from similar calls  
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for freedom'' (3). Once, the military regime returned to power in Egypt, these regimes notably in  
 
Saudi Arabia breathed a sigh of relief ''because it meant Saudi’s interests and alliances were once  
 
again in friendly hands''(3). 
 
          In the meantime, the situation took a turn for the worse when Sheikh Yusuf Al Qaradawi, a 
 
Doha-based Egyptian cleric, harshly criticized, in one of his Friday’s speeches, the Emirati 
 
support for  Egypt's military government. This move irritated the Abu Dhabi government which 
 
summoned Qatar’s ambassador  to deliver ''an official protest memorandum'' over remarks made 
 
by Al Qaradawi ( Reuters.com). 
 
           These incidents, added to others, have allowed the simmering crisis to erupt causing a 
 
considerable friction within the GCC organization. 
 
Qatar reaction 
 
          The Qatari reaction which followed the incident was immediate in the form of an official 
 
communiqué released by the cabinet  which expressed "regret and surprise ''for this move, and  
 
indicated that it would not take tit-for-tat measures, and pull out its envoys affirming its 
 
commitment to "the security and stability" of the GCC (QNA.org). 
 
          The Qatari response was, by and large, hailed for its calm and wise wording which did not 
 
fuel the situation, and left the ball in the three countries' court. It reiterated Qatar's attachment to 
 
the principles of the GCC, and the Emir ''did very well by responding to this threat by not 
 
responding to the threat, continuing the policy as normal, not reacting to any of the demands that  
 
were completely irrational'' (Krieg). 
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          As a matter of fact, a glance at the following developments gives more validity and credit 
 
to this opinion since Qatar stuck to its previous positions, and did not implement, at least in the 
 
early months, any of the demands required by the three countries as Aljazeera continued to work 
 
normally with the same editorial line, and did not refrain ''from granting a voice and platform to  
 
all parties in the conflict, including the Muslim Brotherhood, something which is seen as  
 
incommensurate with the leanings of some of the Arab regimes in the region''(Abdulla 4). 
 
          David Roberts asserts that this move proved Qatar's maturity as against the UAE’s 
 
vociferousness which damaged further the two countries' relations. Moreover, the Qatari reaction  
 
showed a great deal of diplomacy, they chose ''to keep quiet, and wait the time passes so to solve 
 
the issue"( Rickli). The aim of this intelligent move was ''to mitigate the damage, not to enflame 
 
the situation, to try to maintain calm, and not necessarily irritate the other members by repeating  
 
what was said, and it is the practice to do politically and culturally"(Sherwood). 
 
          This wise and pragmatic attitude can be motivated according to Said Al Saqri by the  
 
strategic position of the neighboring countries notably Saudi Arabia which represents for Qatar  
 
''a gateway to the rest of  Arabian peninsula, it is a big neighbour that can easily bully Qatar 
 
which had to play its card very calmly". 
 
          All in all, Qatar dealt with the crisis very tactically, it reacted quietly and avoided 
 
escalation with its traditional allies, and won time to look for potential solutions that could 
 
emerge either from consultations or mediation  attempts initiated mainly by some GCC states as  
 
the research paper is going to examine shortly after. 
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Mediation and reconciliation attempts 
 
          After the outbreak of the incident, there were some attempts, notably within the GCC  
 
states, to contain the crisis and to repair the damage caused by this friction. Thanks to a Kuwaiti  
 
initiative led by Emir Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah, the GCC countries reached on April17 in  
 
Riyadh an accord in which the GCC countries pledged to honour the Riyadh Agreement, and a  
 
committee made up of representatives from the six member countries was set up to follow up on  
 
its implementation( Gulfnews.com).The work of the committee remained mostly secret, but  
 
finally the Qatari officials refused to endorse the report by the committee, even though the other  
 
countries signed it. This refusal denotes Qatar's will to stick to the principles of its foreign policy 
 
which opted to keep quiet, and let time passes to solve the issue. Many hopes were held on 
 
the Arab league Summit hosted by Kuwait, in March2014, to reverse the situation and see the 
 
ambassadors back to Doha, but the deadlock remained despite some reported attempts held on 
 
the sidelines of the summit to narrow the gap between the parties at issue especially by host  
 
country and Oman(Gulfnews.com). 
 
          The Jeddah meeting held in August by the GGC foreign ministers was seen as a last ditch 
 
attempt to redress the situation, but it did bear the expected results, despite Kuwait's statement 
 
that the return of withdrawn Gulf ambassadors to Doha "could happen anytime" (Monitor.com).  
 
Other Gulf diplomatic sources, speaking to news media on condition of anonymity, said the 
 
return of Saudi, Bahraini and Emirati ambassadors to Doha in the near future was unlikely, an  
 
indication that the rift between the four GCC members that led to the recall of the ambassadors  
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in March remained unresolved(Asharq Al-Awsat.net ). 
 
          The failure of the meeting was due to Qatar’s refusal to endorse the report of the  
 
committee supervising Doha’s compliance with the Riyadh Agreement, and its demand for time  
 
to implement all articles of the agreement according to the London-based newspaper. 
 
          The meeting was, for sure, not fully successful, yet it was positive according to some 
 
analysts who highlighted the success of the summit in de-escalating tension: 
 
                  it moved the GCC integration away from a further 
 
                  deterioration, it took away some of the tension, and 
 
                  de-escalated the bad feelings around. The GCC was 
 
                  heading towards a clash of a sort, towards more 
 
                  deterioration, and the meeting in Jeddah just pulled 
 
                  everybody back  away from the edge (Abul Khaliq). 
 
          In fact, opening channels of frank negotiations and direct dialogue is a good indication of 
 
success. The foreign ministers agreed on new criteria and standards to ensure the end of the 
 
differences amid reports that the three countries wanted more concrete steps by Doha, and Qatar  
 
asked for more time to implement the Riyadh Agreement signed on April 17. 
 
          The mediation efforts, however, continued notably by Oman and Kuwait to end the dispute 
 
and bring back relations to normal, and Qatar along with the trio managed ultimately to hammer 
 
out their differences during an extraordinary meeting  held by the GCC leaders on16 November,  
 
2014 in Riyadh, and decided the return of the ambassadors. The announcement made by the  
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GCC described what had been achieved in the Saudi capital as ''an understanding meant to turn a 
 
new page in relations between the six members of the Gulf Organization''. 
 
          The final statement did not give further details, but ''diplomats in Doha said that amongst  
 
other things, Qatar had promised the UAE that the Brotherhood would not be allowed to operate 
 
from the country. There was no immediate confirmation of this'' (Arabianbusiness.com). 
 
          The agreement, reached in a last chance, came in due time to rescue the group's meeting 
 
scheduled in Doha, which avoided missing the rotating presidency  of the GCC following the 
 
summit of December 9-10, and escaped more  pressure from the GCC countries which were 
 
steadfastly determined to put more pressure on Qatar to review its policy as a prerequisite for any 
 
potential accord. 
 
Summary 
 
           The dispute is now solved despite the deep differences between Qatar and the parties at 
 
issue notably over the perception of political Islam, and the quite different vision of their  
 
foreign policies particularly at the regional level. The GCC integration is to function now as it 
 
should be since Qatar  has apparently agreed to honor its engagements with the three countries  
 
during the Riyadh agreement. 
 
          The next chapter will provide a conceptual and theoretical analysis of the GCC in line with 
 
regional integration theories to better understand this organization which has ensured its survival  
 
despite the tremendous challenges. It will also relate it to the different types of regional 
 
integration projects existing elsewhere in the world notably the European Union. This analysis  
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will try to put the GCC in its real conceptual context to help understand the essence of the  
 
organization’s integration. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Regional integration as a concept 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
          This chapter will provide a conceptual and theoretical analysis of the main integration  
 
theories with the aim to show which one fits better with the GCC. Defining integration and  
 
reviewing its different types will be also highlighted to see what makes this regional integration  
 
different from the other organizations notably, the European Union through a detailed  
 
comparison that takes in account the most essential features, similarities and differences between  
 
the two organizations.  
 
          This analysis will certainly allow us to understand why the EU has achieved a string  
 
degree of integration amongst member states, while the GCC is still merely striving to survive  
 
and overcome its internal problems and crises. 
 
Definition of Regional Integration 
 
          It is crucially important to define the notion of regional integration which is extensively 
 
used in modern and contemporary political literature to better understand the eagerly sought  
 
merger of the GCC which stands as a necessity after 33 years of existence in a turbulent and  
 
dynamic world where "the regional institutions are becoming important actors in the world  
 
politics"(Legrenzi and Harders1). However, a good understanding of this notion requires the  
 
definition of ‘region’ in accordance with international relations theories to easily grasp later on  
 
the regional or sub-regional integration with which the GCC is much more concerned. 
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          Joseph Nye defined a region as “a number of states linked together by a geographical  
 
relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence”(qtd. in Webber259). In line with this  
 
definition, regionalism can simply mean the formation of interstate groupings on the basis of a  
 
region. The term ‘region’ may denote no more than a geographical reality, usually a cluster of  
 
states sharing a common space on the globe. This kind of region may be a large continent or a  
 
small group of contiguous states (Fawcett 432). ‘Regioness’ has always been with us, it goes  
 
back many centuries, but it keeps changing, it is like identity which is ''not given once and for 
 
all, it is built up and changes''( Maalouf 23). It includes and excludes for different reasons; Iran  
 
was excluded from the GCC on account of its Persian nature, and Eastern European countries  
 
were included in the EU once they gave up with the Communist ideology. In fact, integration  
 
which is the outcome of this feeling of regioness or regionalism is meant to ensure security and  
 
prosperity to a certain extent. 
 
          Integrations have long been maintained between states in order to achieve certain goals  
 
such as enhancing the general welfare of societies, maintaining national security, and promoting  
 
integration among states in all fields (Al-Makhawi).Integrations are expected to mushroom in the  
 
future since according to Kristian Ulrichsen who purports that no state can stand wholly alone in  
 
the twenty first century, and because today, more than ever before, threats are interrelated, and a 
 
threat to one is a threat to all( UN.org 14). 
 
          More recently, there has been much discussion in the literature about the definition of the  
 
concept of integration; it was, for instance, discussed whether integration refers to a process or 
 
an end product in the words of Laursen who claims that the two can be combined (qtd. in  
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Padmakumara1). Karl Deutsch, for his part, defined integration as: 
 
                   the attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of  
 
                   community’ and of institutions and practices strong 
 
                   enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ 
 
                   time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’  
 
                   among its population (qtd. in Russel et al 319). 
 
         When a group of people or states have been integrated this way, they constitute a  
 
“security community”. ‘Amalgamation’, on the other hand, was used by Deutsch and his 
 
collaborators to refer to “the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a  
 
single larger unit, with some type of common government” (qtd. in Russel et al 319). 
 
           Therefore, the concept of regional integration can be defined as a voluntary process by  
 
which two or more regional states engage into an agreement to promote cooperation through  
 
common institutions and rules. The aims of this agreement range from economic to political,  
 
though it has often taken the form of a political economy initiative where commercial interests  
 
are the focus for achieving broader socio-political and security objectives.  
 
          Regional integration which has always been organized through supranational institutions,  
 
and an intergovernmental decision-making  process, or a combination of both, has different  
 
forms including Free Trade Area, Custom Union, Common Market and Economic Union. These  
 
types of integration are to be developed in detail in the next chapter. 
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Historical background of Integrations 
 
          Regional cooperation or regional integration has always been praised by a plenty of  
 
scholars, it proved to be beneficial; some tasks are well performed by states or multilateral  
 
institutions rather than by a single state (Fawcett 431).  For example, the plague of terrorism  
 
which got momentum in modern times, cannot be defeated by a single state even if it is strong  
 
and powerful like the United States which was victimized by the September 11
th
 attacks, and  
 
called for international cooperation to combat this transnational scourge. 
 
          Regional integration is not a new phenomenon, examples of leagues, confederacies, 
 
councils and their like, representing integration, are spread throughout history.“Some of  
 
them were established for defensive purposes, but not all of them were based on voluntary  
 
assent”( Mattli 1). 
 
          The first serious and voluntary attempt to regional integration took place in1828 when 
 
Prussia established a Customs Union with Hesse-Darmstadt which was followed by other 
 
initiatives, and culminated in the creation of a Swiss Market and Political Union in1848.The  
 
fever of integration struck other European countries including Italy, Austria-Hungary, Holland  
 
and France which forged numerous of integration projects in quest of more welfare and profit.  
 
          Several European politicians such as the foreign minister of Austria-Hungary Count  
 
Goluchowski, who was a staunch defender of the European integration, advocated for a United  
 
Europe in their public speeches. However, all these attempts were doomed to failure for 
 
different reasons including lack of sufficient awareness among the then European leaders who 
16 
 
were engaged in bilateral and multilateral conflicts which were behind the outbreak of two 
 
devastating world wars. 
 
          The idea of the European integration resurged again by the end of the World War II which 
 
reduced the continent's economies into ashes, and Europe was in desperate need of cooperation 
 
to reconstruct its fragile countries via a series of integration projects starting with the creation of  
 
the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. The Europeans stepped up their efforts to  
 
consolidate their integration by establishing the European Community in 1973 which covered  
 
more aspects including trade, monetary system and the political system which allowed this 
 
regional organization to change its name to the European Union by November 1993 to mark the  
 
deep level of integration achieved (Mattli 2). 
 
          As a matter of fact, integration is not a phenomenon which is unique to Europe, it was 
 
witnessed elsewhere in the world notably in Latin America where many serious initiatives were  
 
launched including the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American  
 
Common Market. The launching of integration projects in this region was deemed as “counter- 
 
unions” to inter-European cooperation according to Uruguay's president who made it clear: 
 
                 The formation of a European common market constitutes a state of 
 
                 near-war against Latin American exports. Therefore, we must reply 
 
                 to one integration with another one, to one increase of acquisitive 
 
                 power by internal enrichment by another, to inter- European cooperation 
 
                 by inter-Latin American cooperation (qtd. in the Observer.com). 
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          In the early 60s, integration markets proliferated in this region with the creation of the  
 
Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR) which comprised Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and  
 
Uruguay. In neighboring North America, a Free Trade Agreement between the United States and  
 
Canada was signed in 1989.The agreement turned into the North American Free Trade  
 
Agreement (NAFTA) when Mexico joined in 1994. 
 
          The Asian continent did not remain aloof from this world tide of integration, and formed  
 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. In 1992, its members, who were 
 
eager to consolidate their integration, reached an important agreement to establish gradually an  
 
ASEAN Free Trade Area. Another important and rapid expanding Asian grouping is the Asia  
 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) which was created in 1989 by Australia, New  
 
Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Canada, the United States and the ASEAN countries. 
 
          Africa was not indifferent to this regional integration attempts, and adhered in the early  
 
60s, following the independence of many countries, to several projects above all the  
 
Organization of African Unity in 1963 to promote solidarity and cooperation among the African  
 
countries, and to face up to the numerous challenges faced by these poor and young states after  
 
the departure of the European colonial powers. Other regional integration projects emerged in the  
 
African continent such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which  
 
was established in 1975, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and  
 
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). These African integration  
 
attempts, however, proved to be unsuccessful due to the lack of  financial sources, domestic  
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problems marked by corruption and military coups, and the poor implementation of the  
 
concluded accords and agreements. 
 
          The Arab world witnessed several attempts of integration including the creation of the  
 
Arab League in 1945, the 1964 agreement between Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria to establish an  
 
Arab common market, the 1981 agreement to facilitate and promote intra-Arab trade signed by  
 
eighteen member states of the Arab League, the short-lived Arab Cooperation Council, made up   
 
of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen, and the Maghreb Arab Union, composed of Algeria, Libya,  
 
Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia (Galal and Hoekman 3). 
 
          However, these attempts were not successful, and the Arab economic performance is still  
 
lagging behind, for example, Egypt's per capita income, which was in 1950's  similar to that of  
 
Korea today is less than one-fifth of Korea's. Morocco's per capita GDP, which was close to that  
 
of Malaysia, today is only one-third of Malaysia's (Galal and Hoekman 2).  
 
          The failure of these attempts can be justified by the Arab divisions notably the big friction  
 
which took place among Arabs in 1979, when Egypt was suspended from the Arab League  
 
following its peace accord with Israel (Federalist Debate.org). The Arab rivalries between many  
 
countries speeded up also the demise of the Arab League, and paved the way for more regional  
 
groupings such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Maghreb Arab Union. Both regional  
 
organizations remain below the Arab peoples' expectations though the GCC has managed to  
 
achieve some of the goals announced by its inception. 
 
          The multitude of such integrations throughout the world especially in the post-World War 
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 II era leads us to raise an interesting question: why do states integrate?. This chapter will try to  
 
find out the answer by reviewing the most established international relations theories which  
 
relate to regional integration. 
 
Theories of regional integration 
 
          The proliferation of regional integration in Europe by the end of the Second World War, 
 
and in Africa in the early 60s after the independence of most African countries was accompanied 
 
with mushrooming theoretical studies in a bid to better understand the rise of this worldwide  
 
phenomenon. 
 
          David Mitrany, one of the Functionalism proponents, argues in his essay "a Working  
 
Peace System" published in 1943 that “the problem of our time is not how to keep nations  
 
Peacefully apart, but how to keep them actively together” ( qtd. in Mattli 21). To meet this 
 
challenge, he suggested to introduce a solution that he called “the pragmatic functional 
 
approach” which breaks away from the traditional link between the authority and a particular  
 
territory by ascribing authority to activities based in areas of agreements. He firmly believes that  
 
"peace is likely to grow through doing things together in workshops and market places than by  
 
signing pacts in chancelleries”( qtd. in Mattli 21). 
 
          The functional method centers its theory on a gradual process towards peace and welfare 
 
where each function paves the way for others in a gradual way. Mitrany further explains that  
 
through gradual functional developments and through the provision of common services, the  
 
system may in time even build up solid foundations for closer political association. For him,  
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working together removes political differences, diffuses tensions, consolidates peace and  
 
integrates nations within a stable and a peaceful international system. 
 
          Of course Functionalism is not perfect; it speaks about what should be done to achieve 
 
peaceful coexistence, but it does not fully specify the conditions under which such scheme is 
 
feasible (Mattli). Furthermore, peace is not always the main cause for integration, the adherence 
 
of several European countries including the United Kingdom to the EU is not for peace, but for  
 
other gains and interests. 
 
          Integration was the focus of other theories such as Neo-Functionalism which was at the 
 
centre of debates about European integration from the very beginning in the 1950's until the  
 
early 1990's, and its exponent Ernst Haas who theorized the European experience in his study"  
 
the Uniting of Europe "published in 1958. Haas believes that “nation-states voluntarily mingle,  
 
merge and mix with neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring  
 
new techniques for resolving conflicts between themselves”(qtd. in Jorgensen et al 562).   
 
          Thereby, the political actors shift their loyalties and political activities to new and larger  
 
centres (regional organizations) which get more authority and close ties with the help of interest  
 
groups and supranational regional institutions, and solve the emerging problems of citizens as  
 
part of their logic based on the "spillover" effect which means that economic integration would  
 
gradually build solidarity among the member states. 
 
          This theory, however, proved to be unsuccessful; it neglected too much the notion of 
 
nationalism which was behind the rise of many crises within the process of the EU formation  
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hindered by some political leaders who deemed that some integration aspects were against the  
 
interests of their nations. The 1965 European Community crisis initiated by French president de  
 
Gaulle who stuck to his country's interests, and instructed his ministers not to take part in the  
 
EEC meetings, is a good illustration for the importance of nationalism in foreign relations, and  
 
the failure of the Neo-Functionalist theory. Even Haas himself, was surprised by the rebirth of  
 
nationalism and functional-high politics. 
 
          The neglect of converging national interests, and the exaggeration of the supranational 
 
institutions' role paved the way of other integration theories notably Liberal 
 
Intergovernmentalism led by Andrew Moravcsik, who introduced a new framework based on 
 
three phases: national preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice.  
 
          Moravcsik purports that ''those who intensively desire the benefits of cooperation will  
 
concede more to get them'' ( qtd .in Laursen 7), and the credible threat of exclusion is likely to  
 
generate an even more powerful pressure on recalcitrant states than does the threat of non- 
 
agreement.  In respect to linkage strategies, Moravcsik observes that the major constraint lies in  
 
their domestic distributional implications claiming  that concessions often create domestic  
 
losers, and this will limit the use of package deals (qtd .in Laursen 7). Moravcsik further argues  
 
that states delegate and pool sovereignty to get more credible commitments, to encourage future  
 
cooperation and to improve future implementation of agreements . 
 
          Critics, however, believe that Moravcsik has belittled the role of the 'community 
 
institutions'  which is considered very important when it comes to the implementation of the  
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‘grand bargains’. 
 
The theoretical analysis of the GCC creation 
 
          From the very beginning one should recognize that it is too difficult to theorize all the 
 
political moves around the world within a single approach which cannot capture all  the  
 
complexity of the cotemporary world politics according to S.M .Walt, who argues that "we better  
 
off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy” ( qtd. in  
 
Richard Little and ‎Michael Smith 387). 
 
          Indeed, the Gulf Cooperation Council is a peculiar organization as it aims at furthering  
 
integration in both the security and economic realms (Legrenzi41). The ambiguity witnessed at  
 
the level of aims stated in the founding Charter created confusion among analysts who found it  
 
difficult to put the GCC within  a particular international relations theory .Even its achievements  
 
create controversy among scholars : 
 
                 Some scholars have emphasized the lofty but unfulfilled promises 
 
                 made by the GCC leaders in the security sphere, while others have 
 
                 tried to derive some satisfaction from the slightly more encouraging 
 
                 results achieved in the sphere of economic coordination and integration 
 
                ( Legrenzi 41). 
 
          The peculiarity of the GCC lies in the hybrid nature of its creation which resists all 
 
theoretical explanations, we do not know whether this regional organization is an economic 
 
institution or a military alliance. A quick glance at the GCC Charter will surprise us with a 
23 
 
multitude of aims. It speaks about a lot of objectives at the same time such as economic  
 
cooperation, coordination and ultimately union as mentioned in the preamble. 
 
          The variety of objectives makes the achievement of these goals too hard because it is the  
 
combination of everything, the case which has never existed in the charters of similar regional 
 
grouping including the European Union which was mainly based on economic integration, or 
 
the NATO which set from the very beginning military alliance as its core target. The clear vision  
 
of these two major regional bodies defined their activity within a particular road map, and  
 
speeded up their success which is now quite visible. 
 
          Even the decision-making process within the organization is quite different from any other 
 
regional grouping on account of its top-down character, and the absence of checks and balances  
 
which make it easy to take decisions over some issues when they reach the level of the Supreme  
 
Council due to the close personal relationship linking the six leaders described by the former  
 
GCC secretary general Abdullah Bishara as “a club of elderly gentlemen" (Legrenzi 43). Their  
 
contacts are constant throughout the year and not confined to the official and formal meetings. 
 
          Legrenzi (42) purports that the Neorealist approach, which claims that most states tend to  
 
behave in the same way when facing an identical situation, is fundamental in understanding the  
 
GCC states which rushed to establish the grouping in 1981 to face up to the turbulent  
 
circumstances witnessed by the region during this period marked by the Iran-Iraq war and the  
 
Iranian Revolution. This approach is well grounded as external threats for the survival of the  
 
local regimes were serious and quite visible during the group creation. 
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         This reasoning was equally advocated by many Neorealist proponents such as Kenneth 
 
Waltz, who saw that regional integration as the response of weak states to potential hegemonic  
 
powers. In the case of GCC, Iraq and Iran were the two big states which posed serious external  
 
threat and even internal threat by manipulating their followers in the six small countries namely  
 
the Baathist intellectuals or Shias who were heavily present, and very influential in some GCC  
 
states. Yet, security fears were not the unique driving force for the GCC establishment; the 
 
Kuwaitis, for example, called for an economic organization similar to the European Union, and  
 
The Saudis advocated political coordination to face up to the Iranian and Iraqi mounting 
 
influence in the region. 
 
          Neo-Realism was challenged by Neoliberal theoreticians who inspired their assumptions 
 
from the liberal thinking mostly forged in a Western context. The Liberals believe that common  
 
values and interests can induce states to work together. This theory may help to explain the GCC  
 
formation as well, since the organization constituents shared more or less the same values which  
 
mainly included common history, same language and same religion. 
 
          The Neo-liberal approach had some support from the British Functionalist School of 
 
thought which argued that if states are to perform specific functions, they tend to cooperate to  
 
solve common specific problems or challenges, thus mutual understanding and harmony between  
 
these states emerge with time and through a difficult bottom-up process (Legrenzi 45). This 
 
theory can help to better understand the establishment of the GCC which came basically for a  
 
particular function namely to avert the then external threats. Yet, the bottom-up process for 
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reaching harmony between states does not appear in the Gulf monarchies where the final  
 
decision is always reserved to rulers and not bureaucrats or institutions. 
 
          Constructivism which was so popular by the beginning of the twentieth century, and 
 
stresses belonging and identity as a major factor for regional integration can be used in the GCC 
 
case to analyze the essence of this organization. For the constructivists, the notion of identity 
 
can play a considerable role in alliance formation. In this context, Arabism and Islam, as 
 
common identical components of the region, are very crucial in the GCC establishment; the six  
 
leaders were strongly determined to exclude Iran from their grouping on account of its Persian 
 
origin, and resisted the adherence of Iraq which was ideatically  different from the six states 
 
with the coming to power of the Baathist party which was deemed as a revisionist state that 
 
threatened their status quo organization. 
 
          However, this approach lacks all justification when the timing of GCC formation is taken 
 
into consideration. In fact, the identical values between the member states existed before 1981, 
 
but the organization was not formed. Another reason for the non-standing of this theoretical  
 
approach is the neglect of two neighboring countries namely Yemen and Jordan though they 
 
share more or less the same values. 
 
           Finally, one has to make the difference between Federal and Confederal systems which  
 
have been associated with integration projects. Federal union refers to ''a federated sovereign  
 
state formed by establishment of a closely-knit, or tightly-knit, union of  two or more smaller  
 
political communities, which, after formation of the union, are no longer sovereign(completely  
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independent ) but do retain a significant degree of  autonomy''(Way).This system is featuring the 
 
The United States of America. In the Confederal system, the union is a loosely-held together  
 
league or association of virtually sovereign states that's to say a loose union or alliance of almost  
 
completely independent states (Ibid). The European Union stands as a good example of a  
 
contemporary confederation. 
           In line with this definition, we can easily notice that the GCC does not belong to neither  
of them; the organization is not federal since its members are completely independent, and can  
even adopt opposite decisions like what happened with the Egyptian revolution, and it is not also  
confederal since it differs in its functions from the European Union which incarnates the  
contemporary way of confederation, and lacks the tools of a confederal system notably a central  
boby which provides support for all members. 
Summary 
           This chapter has demonstrated that no single theoretical approach can account alone for  
 
the genesis of the GCC which is a bit of all international relations theories due to the unique and  
 
hybrid nature of this organization; Constructivism which stresses identity and belonging as a  
 
major factor for regional integration  could serve to explain the GCC creation, ditto for the  
 
Neorealist approach which can fit with the organization's creation since it claims that states tend  
 
to behave in the same way when facing an identical situation, and that was the case for GCC  
 
when the Iranian threat emerged. 
 
          Therefore, all integration theories can relate to the establishment of the GCC but with  
 
different levels. Even the ruling system existing in the area marked by a top-bottom decision- 
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making process dominated by local rulers, and the constant changes taking place in the sub- 
 
region including the rise of a Khaleeji identity which contributed to the demise of Pan- 
 
Arabism rendered the theorization of the GCC formation within a particular analytical 
 
approach a very complex and difficult task. 
 
          The following chapter will dig into areas of regional cooperation witnessed by the 
 
GCC over the past 33 years to assess its achievements and to review the challenges met 
 
by the council, and how it affected its running and progress. 
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Chapter Three 
 
                                               The GCC as a Regional Organization 
 
Introduction 
 
          This chapter will review the different types of economic integration witnessed by the GCC 
 
since its inception in 1981 to assess what has been achieved so far, and what has been  
 
unfulfilled, or sustained delay due some challenges encountered by the organization while  
 
attempting to complete its integration process. The focus will be on the economic integration in 
 
line with the classical classification of Bela Balassa who divided, in his book "The Theory of  
 
Economic Integration" written in1961, economic integration into five pillars namely free trade  
 
area, customs union, common market, economic union and ultimately  political union(qtd. in  
 
Hosny134). 
 
Regionalism and Regionalization 
 
          The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was launched in May 1981 against the backdrop of 
 
the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Iraq-Iran war in addition to the Soviet invasion of 
 
Afghanistan. Therefore, the primary aim was to avert any potential threat. The creation of the  
 
GCC was a rapid and easy process; rapid because it took only about three months to finalize the  
 
project due to the huge external threats challenging the area at that time, and it was easy because 
 
the six founding countries shared, more or less, similar political systems, and a common tribal,  
 
social and cultural background. 
 
          They are absolute monarchies with a limited political participation except for Kuwait 
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where "'the constitution and the parliament exercise some real constraints on the ruling 
 
Emir, although most political power still lies with the ruler and his family"(Kinninmont 2).The  
 
six constituent states are collectively very rich, they possess almost half of the world's oil  
 
reserves. 
 
          However, the GCC creation was not only intended to face up to this turbulent situation, it  
 
was also to boost economic cooperation between "the political leaderships of six neighboring  
 
states which seek to cooperate or collaborate in areas of common interest" (Partrick 2). This aim  
 
is clearly mentioned in the founding charter of the GCC which stresses particularly in article 4,  
 
the most important of all, coordination, integration and interdependence (tanseeq, takamal wa  
 
tarabit) between them in all fields to strengthen relations between the constituent members, and  
 
to promote cooperation among the countries’ citizens in order to achieve "unity between them'' 
 
(GCC Charter, article 4). 
 
          The striking feature in this charter, however, is the drop of security though it was believed 
 
to be the raison d'être of its creation. The only identified areas in which cooperation should occur  
 
are economic and financial affairs; commerce, customs and communications; and education and  
 
culture. In these areas the charter states that there should be ‘similar regulations’ (article 3). 
 
          In order to understand the GCC as a Regional Organization, one must make a clear 
 
distinction between two concepts well spread out  in the international relations literature namely 
 
Regionalism and Regionalization. 
 
                 Regionalism is the expression of a common sense of identity and 
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                 destiny combined with the creation of institutions that express that 
 
                 identity and shape collective action, whereas, Regionalization is the 
 
                 expression of increased commercial and human transactions in a 
 
                 defined geographical space (Evans 196). 
 
          In line with this definition, the regionalization process preceded regionalism in the area 
 
since civic and professional organizations managed to hold regularly meetings on a gulf basis  
 
even before the GCC creation with the Development Forum in 1979 within which bureaucrats, 
 
professionals and academics have been meeting once a year to discuss ways and means of  
 
enhancing development in the region. In this context, the GCC as a regionalization project is  
 
more successful than regionalism since the professional organizations are older, and hold regular  
 
meetings on a Gulf basis, as against the slow and almost ineffective integrating policies adopted  
 
by the GCC official institutions which progressed with a pace that has always been below the 
 
expectations of the region's citizens, and recorded the lowest degree of regional economic 
 
cooperation on account of the mentality of the Arab states which tend to compete rather than to  
 
cooperate (Aarts 921). 
 
          To assess the progress witnessed by the GCC states over the past 33 years, we have to 
 
 scrutinize five types of regional economic formations proposed by Bela Balassa which are: free 
 
trade areas, customs unions, common markets, economic unions and fully integrated economies  
 
usually called by some scholars "political union". 
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The Free Trade Area 
 
          A Free Trade Area is usually defined as ''a preferential trade arrangement in which  
 
member countries do not impose any trade barriers (zero tariffs) on goods produced within the 
 
union. However, each country keeps its own tariff barriers to trade with non-members. It is 
 
usually referred to as trade integration"(Hosny134). 
 
          Free trade areas allow the signatory nations to concentrate on their comparative advantages 
 
and to produce the goods they are comparatively more efficient at making, thus increasing the  
 
efficiency and profitability of each country. The European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the 
 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are the most famous and successful free trade 
 
areas, the former was established in 1960, and the latter was created in 1994 by Canada, the  
 
United States and Mexico to promote trade between these North American countries. 
 
            Just after the establishment of the GCC, an economic agreement was concluded in  
 
November 1981. This agreement contained the main provisions of the GCC Free Trade Area 
 
which came into effect in March 1983, and was mainly featured by exempting the GCC 
 
industrial, agricultural and natural resources products from customs duties and other similar 
 
duties. The GCC Free Trade Area continued for almost twenty years until the end of 2002. 
 
During the FTA period between 1983 and 2002, the volume of Intra-GCC trade witnessed 
 
a considerable increase that went from less than US$ 6 billion in 1983 to some US$ 20 billion in  
 
2002. However, this rise remained very slow and almost insignificant when compared to the  
 
European achievement, and the ''economic integration was largely declaratory, and did not show  
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a major progress for a decade''(Copper).  
 
          This belief is shared also by Lawson who argues that the GCC economic integration did  
 
not witness a significant increase until the early 2000's. He further classifies the GCC as an FTA/  
 
collective security pact that offers initiatives designed to increase interdependence, with  
 
supranational authority over several main issue-areas, operating under a veto system centered on  
 
Saudi Arabia (11). 
 
              The Gulf  FTA was not really a telling success due to numerous reasons including the 
 
hegemony of Saudi Arabia which decided, for example, by early 1988 ''to raise customs duties 
 
from 7% to 12% ad valorem on most imports, while increasing tariffs from 10% to 20% on re- 
 
exports coming into the kingdom port Rashid in the UAE'' (Lawson 8). This move urged Bahrain 
 
to adopt new regulations authorizing state agencies to discriminate in favor of domestic products, 
 
so long as the price differential between locally-produced items and equivalent imports remained  
 
less than 10%. 
 
              Nechi justifies the failure of GCC integration mainly by the control of national  
 
governments over hydrocarbon production, the weak supranational institutions, the national  
 
competition in industries, and weak infrastructure as the main hindrances to integration(107). For 
 
his part, Copper  believes that the GCC monarchs, who have the whole political power in their  
 
hands, are jealous of their national sovereignty, and are not quick to relinquish control over  
 
economic matters which is a big major hindrance to integration he argues . 
 
           Furthermore, the GCC states did not have a common position vis-à-vis numerous 
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economic issues especially during difficult times following the fall of oil prices; each 
 
government responded to the crisis in a different fashion. Moreover, some members of the  
 
organization acted in a unilateral way, and rushed to conclude free trade agreements with the  
 
United States including Bahrain and Oman in 2004 without the slightest consultation with the  
 
other members. This move outraged Saudi Arabia which considered this behaviour as a violation  
 
to the GCC economic accords and decisions. But, the growing interest in such treaties by the 
 
remaining GCC countries led the finance ministers of the organization to allow the constituent 
 
members in 2005 to set up free trade areas with outside countries to diffuse tension, and to cope 
 
with the developing situation. 
 
Customs Union 
 
          Customs union has been defined by the GAAT Agreement as: a single customs territory  
 
substituting for two or more customs territories, so that duties and other restrictive regulations of 
 
commerce are eliminated between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect 
 
to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories, and the same duties and 
 
other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of 
 
territories not included in the union (article 24). 
 
          The introduction of customs union promotes trade among members, makes exporting 
 
easier, renders  the cost of goods more competitive with domestic products, and protects local  
 
industries of members when conducting business in protected trade area from non-members. 
 
          Being aware of these numerous advantages of a single customs union, the GCC leaders 
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rushed to establish their customs union, and launched this process two years only after the 
 
creation of this regional grouping .However, the project which kicked off in 1983, witnessed a  
 
series of delays on account of disagreements over a formula on how to divide revenues; the 
 
member states could not determine the best way to distribute revenues due to the economic  
 
weight of each country. 
 
          The partial application of the customs union, nevertheless, contributed effectively to 
 
increase sharply the volume of inter-GCC trade which went up from $32 billion in 2005 to $100  
 
billion in 2012 (Gulf News.com). The full application of customs union would certainly lead to a  
 
significant increase as it would remove all obstacles that obstruct the smooth flow of goods and  
 
service .To this effect, the GCC finance ministers agreed on, during a regular meeting held in the  
 
Kuwaiti capital, in May 2014, to fully implement the customs union as from January 2015. The  
 
GCC officials agreed, in June 2012, to set up a customs union authority to complete the revenue- 
 
sharing debate with a set of options to resolve this disagreement including the division of 
 
revenues according to the level of imports, population or the share of gross domestic product of 
 
individual countries (Dokoupil ). 
 
              Despite the similarities existing between the exportable goods of the GCC countries,  
 
which may constitute an obstacle to trade between the GCC states, the full implementation of 
 
customs union will, for sure, increase trade among Gulf nations by facilitating the smooth  
 
movement of goods and investments, allowing more joint ventures, and contributing to 
 
commodity diversification. Therefore, a customs union remains very vital for all GCC countries  
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as they look forward to diversifying their sources of income and reducing reliance on oil 
 
revenues, both to fund budgets or to develop projects (Al Asoomi). 
 
Common Market 
 
          In January 2008, the Supreme Council formally inaugurated the GCC common market, 
 
which promised to allow the unrestricted movement of goods, capital, and labor across the 
 
borders of the six member-states. This new regionalist initiative was set also to pave the way for 
 
a monetary union and single currency in 2010. The introduction of a common market allows  
 
citizens of any GCC member state to enjoy full citizenship rights in all other GCC countries, and 
 
endows them with equal treatment in respect of all economic activities, particularly, movement  
 
and residence. GCC citizens are also allowed to work in private and public sectors in each  
 
member state, and benefit from the same rights in areas such as healthcare, education, social 
 
security and residence, as well as in economic activities like trading in stock markets, setting up 
 
companies, and buying and selling properties. 
 
          Nevertheless, the inauguration of the common market accompanied a slow but steady rise 
 
in regional economic and occupational mobility among GCC citizens according to Lawson who  
 
stated that by 2010, some 21,000 nationals had taken up permanent employment in a GCC state  
 
other than their country of origin(14). For the most part, GCC expatriates were attracted to  
 
professional and commercial opportunities in Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE, and were drawn away 
 
from Bahrain and Oman, whose economies have been characterized by much tighter job markets  
 
for white collar workers (Lawson 14). 
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              The GCC common market was not that successful for different reasons mainly the ill 
 
implementation of the customs union, which is regarded as a prerequisite for the creation of a  
 
common market, in addition to other constraints and obstacles such as discrimination in the 
 
treatment and non-realization of the principle of full citizenship .The absence of unified and 
 
binding GCC laws, different accounting systems for companies, legislation gaps and lack of  
 
uniformity in implementation further contributed to the non- achievement of this important stage 
 
in the process of regional integration. 
 
Economic Union 
 
              After over three decades of existence, the GCC has achieved a host of economic goals; 
 
The GCC joint policy has allowed the member countries' citizens to enjoy a plenty of rights in 
 
terms of travel and work; the region's people can move from one place to another within the Gulf  
 
freely without a passport, but only with an ID. The Gulf people are allowed to work in the six  
 
countries without restrictions. 
 
          The council promotes also a healthy feeling of cooperation between nations in all aspects, 
 
be they sports like the Gulf cup they hold every 2 years, or economic like the banning of tariffs  
 
between nations, etc. A common GCC electricity grid has been developed by the GCC  
 
Interconnection Authority, it is based in the Saudi city of Khobar, and it is shared by all six  
 
member states. Since 2009 it has linked four GCC states namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain  
 
and Qatar in a common grid. In April 2011 the UAE was connected to the grid too. 
 
              Yet, these lofty achievements are not enough since numerous projects are still lagging 
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behind such as the rail way project, the common market, and above all the single currency which 
 
was launched in mid-December 1991, when the governors of the six central banks announced 
 
that they intended to issue a single currency by1999. The project was given a remarkable impetus  
 
when Kuwait decided to peg the value of the Kuwaiti dinar to that of the US Dollar alike the  
 
other GCC countries. Single currency and monetary union were deemed very important to speed  
 
up integration, as they would encourage a fresh wave of trade and investment around the region. 
 
However, the single currency dream suffered a serious blow in 2009, when the UAE withdrew  
 
from the project following a disagreement with Saudi Arabia which insisted on hosting the joint  
 
central bank instead of Abu Dhabi. The Saudi intransigence weakened the whole process  
 
already fragilized by Oman's drop in 2006,saying it was not ready. 
 
               Nevertheless, the project is not totally abandoned as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and 
 
Bahrain set up, in March 2010, a forerunner to the Gulf central bank, a "monetary council", but 
 
the institution has kept a low profile since then. The absence of the UAE is seen as a serious 
 
obstacle to the achievement of this goal according to Abdul khaliq Abdulla who was quoted  
 
as saying that "The monetary union minus UAE is not a monetary union, it's not feasible, the 
 
smaller states would rather wait and slow down until the UAE is ready to join in" (Dokoupil). 
 
           Despite this major setback, and the ill-functioning of the GCC which remains below the 
 
peoples' expectations when compared with the European Union, the organization has made a lot 
 
of progress over the past years, and the multiple attempts to join the GCC either by the adjacent 
 
countries including Jordan and Yemen is a telling evidence of its success. 
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          In fact, the openness of the GCC leaders to the outside world is a healthy sign of the 
 
organization which started considering future expansion with potential members notably Jordan, 
 
Yemen and Iraq and even Morocco which was invited in 2011 by the council to join the Union 
 
 (New York Times.com). A five year economic program was granted to this Maghrebian country 
 
which engaged discussions over its accession to the Union though the Moroccan chances are 
 
really minor because this African monarchy has the geopolitical perspective, but lacks the 
 
geographic proximity which is very important in such alliances (Braizat). 
 
Political Integration 
 
          The GCC is made of three main bodies the highest of which is The Supreme Council 
 
which comprises the heads of states, it holds two meetings annually. It provides policy directions 
 
and nominates the secretary general of the GCC Secretariat. It passes resolutions related to the 
 
substantial matters with unanimous votes. 
 
           The second important structure of the GCC is the Ministerial Council of the foreign 
 
ministers which proposes policies and prepares recommendations. The Council is composed of a 
 
number of committees in charge of finance, education, health and labour which are in charge of 
 
preparing studies and submitting recommendations to the Supreme Council. 
 
            The GCC Secretariat is the administrative and executive body; it is entrusted with 
 
preparing the Supreme and Ministerial Councils meetings, carrying out studies and reports, and 
 
monitoring the implementation of past decisions. It is regarded as an independent body, and it is  
 
run with a budget shared equally among member states. 
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          The three components of the GCC are doing their utmost to meet the increasing  
 
aspirations of the region's peoples in terms of integration, but their achievements remain below  
 
popular expectations; there are many latent issues the most important are the territorial disputes  
 
which fuelled much tension between many countries including the Huwar Islands which 
 
worsened for a long time the Qatari-Bahraini relations before its settlement outside the GCC  
 
framework in 2001 as it will be examined in a detailed way in the fifth chapter of this thesis. 
 
          Another point that explains the unsatisfactory political performance of the GCC is its way 
 
of treating key issues; rulers are the sole decision-makers who deal directly with big issues 
 
instead of experts and professionals within their relevant panels, as it is the case within the  
 
European Union where panels and commissions have more prerogatives since they are composed  
 
of experts and knowledgeable figures, while in the GCC, rulers are the main if not the sole 
 
decision-makers. 
 
          The GCC is sometimes referred to as an "all talk and no act" organization because it does  
 
not go ahead with all its plans and projects among them the single currency and the common  
 
market or even the common curriculum. The GCC leaders held several past meetings, they  
 
discussed a set of issues, but no concrete decisions emanated from these meetings. Some scholars 
 
believe that Saudi hegemony is one of the major reasons behind the lackluster political  
 
performance of the GCC. Usually, Saudi Arabia is referred to as "big sister", it has the last say in  
 
major issues due to its greater power in the region, this domination aroused a bad feeling among  
 
the remaining members who had to hide their discontent over some issues to avert the Saudi 
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anger. 
 
          In fact, the lack of consensus among the GCC countries on a host of issues, is seen by 
 
Jamie Chandler, a professor of political science at Hunter College in New York City, as one of  
 
the major obstacles hindering fruitful cooperation as they have not treated the new threats  with 
 
 “a comprehensive, diplomatically driven strategy, but each member has responded individually.  
 
It will be hard to break this pattern” (International Business Times.com). 
 
Summary 
 
          This chapter has provided evidence that cooperation between the GCC member Countries  
 
has borne some fruitful results in some aspects, but it is still lagging behind, and economic 
 
integration and political union seem to be far-off objectives since the Gulf region remains a  
 
patchwork of regulations and regimes. The need for integration does not look to be pressing  
 
since these wealthy states are always awash with oil revenues, and their leaders are so jealous for  
 
national sovereignty, and not ready to delegate power to supranational institutions notably the  
 
Secretariat General which seems to be powerless, and reports only what has been agreed by the 
 
supreme leaders. 
 
          Sensitivity between GGC members motivated by old rivalries on account of border  
 
disputes, and fears felt by small countries of the Saudi hegemony are further reasons for the 
 
slowdown of integration between the GCC states which have a lot of factors in common, and  
 
share more or less the same destiny with manifold threats and security challenges which  the next 
 
chapter will develop in details along with the GCC foreign policy to see how they constitute a 
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barrier to the integration of the Organization. 
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Chapter Four 
 
                                   Foreign and Security Policy: A Barrier to Integration 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
            This chapter aims at exploring the forces or drivers that modeled the foreign and security  
 
policies of the GCC states  which became very important internationally due to numerous events 
 
which happened there, and attracted the whole world attention such as the Gulf war and the  
 
invasion of Iraq. Their role as strategic energy exporters “has allowed them to assume and  
 
cultivate power on the international level” (Wright 72). Being key members at the OPEC, has  
 
strengthened their position on the international scene, and stamped their foreign policy with  
 
particular features. 
 
          In fact, understanding the foreign policy of the GCC states is not an easy task due to the 
 
hybrid nature of these countries which are different and alike at the same time; their regional  
 
history is similar with strong tribal ties, but domestically different. Islam represents a unifying 
 
force between them, but bears also the seeds of hostility with obvious divergences, and even  
 
conflicts between Arab Sunnis and Shiites notably in Bahrain where Shiites outnumber Sunnis. 
 
           Therefore, understanding the foreign policy of the GCC states is a complex process that  
 
requires a multilevel analysis due to a variety of multilayered factors which yielded this unique  
 
situation, and marked the GCC foreign policy with distinctive features imposed by some forces  
 
or drivers that the current chapter will highlight to see how they impeded the GCC integration  
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process. 
 
Security 
 
              Security which was the main factor behind the GCC creation, had always been a major  
 
concern for the region's countries. It was, in the words of Steven Wright the primary driver of  
 
GCC foreign relations. Being aware of their important geostrategic position, and their  
 
vulnerability, the GCC states looked for the British protection since1793, when Britain 
 
established business in the region with the opening of an East India agency in Basra .The  
 
security of the Gulf region against any foreign attack was then the duty of the British who  
 
protected these small states from 1820 till 1971with the signature of a series of security  
 
agreements starting from a General Treaty in 1820, and a Maritime Truce in 1835. These treaties  
 
culminated in the conclusion of the Trucial States in 1835, Bahrain in 1861, Kuwait in 1899 and 
 
again in 1914,  and Qatar in 1916. The British presence provided insurance to the local rulers, it 
 
was a guarantee for them especially with a bad Kuwaiti experience when the freshly independent  
 
state in 1961 was claimed to be incorporated into Iraq by the then ruler Abdul Karim Qasim, and  
 
the royal forces had to come back to free the country. 
 
          The British departure from the area in 1971 created a power vacuum with two major 
 
players namely Iraq and Iran, and aroused fears among the Sheikhs who were ready to pay the 
 
British to maintain their security. The GCC countries with their small native population and the 
 
vulnerability of their oil installations felt unsecured, and found themselves compelled to search 
 
for another external protector to restore order and redress the situation or the imbalance. The  
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search for a foreign protector seems to be an intrinsic feature of the Gulf countries according to  
 
some scholars who argued : 
 
                 historically, the six states which now comprise the GCC have 
 
                 relied on an external security guarantor both to safeguard the 
 
                 rulers' internal position and to protect them against external 
 
                 threats from the larger  regional powers (Ulrichsen 3). 
 
          This attitude is quite visible in the domestic history of each single GCC country including 
 
Kuwait which relied on the United States to free the country from the Iraqi invaders, Oman  
 
which asked for foreign help to oust Sultan Said Bin Taimur (1932-1970), or even Saudi Arabia  
 
which was helped by France to end a domestic trouble namely the Mecca Rebellion staged  
 
during the Pilgrimage season of 1979 by Juhayman  Al Otaybi and his followers to overthrow  
 
the Al Saud dynasty. 
 
              The new guarantor was the United States which had to fill the vacuum left by the British  
 
withdrawal, and to protect its interests even militarily according to President Jimmy Carter who  
 
stated, in his 1980 Doctrine, that the United States would use military force if necessary to  
 
defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf region (Bennett 3). The US-Arabian ties were  
 
consolidated by a series of separate defence cooperation agreements with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar  
 
and the United Arab Emirates, an access to facilities agreement with Oman, and the wide range  
 
of military agreements which have underpinned Saudi Arabian security since the 1940s  
 
(Ulrichsen 4). 
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          Despite this overreliance on foreign protection, the GCC region remained volatile and 
 
vulnerable, it was the scene of three interstate devastating wars namely the Iran- Iraq war (1980- 
 
88), the first Gulf war (1991), and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.These wars obstructed the 
 
GCC integration project which had to repair the damage after each armed conflict, to rebuild 
 
trust between members, and to pay a heavy bill for casualties or for sponsorship. For instance,  
 
Kuwait paid huge amounts either cash or in the form of direct investment projects for those  
 
countries which took part in the liberation of the Emirate. 
 
          The concept of Gulf security, according to Ulrichsen (1), is evolving in response to new  
 
challenges which link internal security to external stability and international events in the region, 
 
that's to say that the 80's threats mainly posed by Iran and Iraq are no longer similar to those of  
 
the beginning of the 21
st
 century marked by a troubled Levant, a rising Turkey and a chaotic 
 
situation in Egypt, a key strategic player in the region, in the wake of a series of Arab Spring 
 
Revolutions that jolted some countries of the Arab World .the feeling of constant insecurity is a 
 
real hindrance to GCC integration since the member states are always busy with finding 
 
external protectors, very often with a heavy cost, and remain very vigilant to diffuse tensions 
 
created by regional powers to ensure their hegemony and to export their ideas and regimes. 
 
Personalization 
 
          Due to the flagrant absence of institutions, or their limited role as it is the case of the 
 
Kuwait parliament, the GCC policy tends to be more personalized usually dominated by a small 
 
number of elite, or within the ruling family or the idiosyncrasy of the leader despite the presence  
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of a heavy staff of foreign ministry according to Steven Wright who highlighted this point “GCC  
 
international relations often closely mirror the idiosyncrasies of the leader in power”(79). For  
 
example, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was described as a conservative person with less  
 
support to USA, this attitude is thought to have created problems with late King Fahd who was  
 
pro-American and his position vis-a-vis the Iraq-Iran war was a clear evidence of this trend. 
 
          Very often the GCC institutions were surprised by unilateral or personal decisions taken  
 
by the rulers or monarchs without referring to competent bodies either foreign ministries or  
 
parliaments (consultative bodies).This feature does not exist elsewhere in the world; all  
 
important state decisions have to be debated and approved by parliaments or other competent  
 
institutions before being implemented. 
 
          This individual attitude cast its shadow even on the functioning of the GCC itself where 
 
personal decisions taken by the rulers without consulting the relevant staff have always shaped 
 
their summits and meetings. Some personalized decisions have caused a considerable damage to 
 
the Organization. For instance, the unilateral decisions taken by Oman and Bahrain, of course by  
 
their rulers, to sign bilateral FTAs with the United States outraged the Saudi Kingdom, caused a  
 
drift among members, and weakened their position with the European Union when negotiations  
 
were underway to launch a Free Trade Agreement. Matteo Legrenzi argues that despite the 
 
existence of the organization for more than thirty years “institutionalization played a very small 
 
role in the life of  GCC”(87). He further asserts that “it (GCC) has proved its worth as forum for  
 
policy coordination, but individual states have rarely sacrificed their foreign policy priorities on  
 
47 
the altar of reaching a common stance”(Legrenzi 87). 
 
          This striking feature did not allow GCC to act as a common block when negotiating with  
 
foreign actors due to the absence of supranational institutions which give more strength to  
 
regional bodies such the EU, and render their decisions more credible and very swift without 
 
being delayed by a heavy bureaucratic machinery. 
 
Sectarianism 
 
          Sectarianism is very influential in GCC foreign relations, Bahrain with a Shiite majority 
 
outnumbering the Sunnis has always been subject to Iran's interventions. The same problem was  
 
felt by Saudi Arabia whose Shiite population are concentrated in the AL Hassa region which 
 
witnessed unrest by the outbreak of the Iranian revolution in 1979. The sectarian phenomenon  
 
has a heavy bearing on the international relations of these two countries. 
 
          However, this feature has a lesser scope in the four remaining GCC countries according to 
 
Majidyar who believes that these states managed to integrate successfully their Shiite population 
 
into their sophisticated socio-political and economic spheres adding that the" Shiites strongly  
 
identify themselves as citizens of their respective countries, and remain loyal to their ruling 
 
regimes” (1). These states knew how to manage the Shiites cleverly. In Oman, for instance,  
 
where the number of non-Sunnis (Ibadis) is very limited, the government attached them a great  
 
importance; they were appointed in high ranking positions as ambassadors, cabinet ministers and  
 
members of the Diwan of the Royal Court. In UAE, they enjoy more freedom, the Emirati  
 
government allows them to congregate, and to worship in their own mosques. Furthermore, some  
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Sunni government members attend their religious celebrations to promote harmony among 
 
citizens independently from their religious and sectarian belongings. However, with the spillover  
 
effects of the Arab Spring Revolutions, the Emirati federal government has become more 
 
vigilant with the Shiite population, and the Emirates have become less hospitable for the Iranian 
 
business community (Majidyar 4). Shiite minority in Qatar is well integrated, they practice freely  
 
their religious rituals, and they enjoy good relations with the ruling family, their number is  
 
limited in this country, and they remain loyal to their state above all other foreign Shiite 
 
influence (Majidyar 5). 
 
          The Shiite demands notably after the Arab Spring were not to overthrow the local 
 
monarchs, they were mainly social; people asked for better living conditions, more job 
 
opportunities and greater political participation via the introduction of new reforms. Therefore, 
 
their protests, though they were a little bit violent in Bahrain and to a lesser degree in Oman,  
 
were contained by the local governments which assigned, with the help of some GCC countries  
 
especially Saudi Arabia, huge financial packages to ease tension and to diffuse the crisis. 
 
          The rulers' fears were motivated by a possible Iranian exploitation of the events by 
 
manipulating its nationals living in the GCC countries to disturb the already existing sectarian 
 
balance. As a result, the Gulf states initiated a series of restrictions such as the limitation of visas  
 
to Iranians, and the expulsion of some Shiites seen as dangerous to curb with their activities, and 
 
reduce their impact in fuelling the situation. 
 
          Sectarianism is therefore, a driving force in the GCC regional foreign relations especially  
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with neighboring Iran and Iraq or even Syria and Lebanon, the GCC states tune their regional  
 
relations with these countries according to the prevailing situation there. However, the best 
 
solution to contain sectarianism in the GCC countries is to include all Sunnis and Shiites, and to  
 
offer equal rights and opportunities between them with equal religious freedom to make them  
 
melt in one pot, and to close the door for any Iranian manipulation. 
 
Other drivers 
 
          There are other forces that influence the GCC foreign relations, one of them is the social  
 
make-up of the GCC countries marked by a heavy presence of expatriates. This phenomenon has 
 
a role in determining the foreign policy of the Gulf monarchies especially in terms of bilateral  
 
relations. For example, the escalation which happened between the UAE and Pakistan in 1992  
 
following the huge demonstrations staged in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah by expelled illegal 
 
Indian and Pakistani workers forced the Emirati president to visit Pakistan to resolve the  
 
situation. The GCC countries have to tune their foreign policy with this internal reality. The 
 
same principle is dittoed with Iranians living in these states which  have to pay more attention 
 
not anger this large faction or outrage Teheran. 
 
          Foreign aid is another tool of the GCC foreign relations, it has been successfully used to 
 
reach difficult agreements with countries in need, for instance, Qatar managed to broker 
 
agreements in Lebanon and Sudan thanks to its tremendous financial capacities.  This means is  
 
usually used by the wealthy monarchies through their Sovereignty Funds to promote solidarity 
 
with Muslim and Arab countries, to sway other countries for getting direct investment projects, 
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or simply to show off and gain prestige. 
 
          In fact, the GCC foreign policy is not an easy task to be defined, its requires a 
 
comprehensive process that takes into account several elements including the historical and  
 
social background, sectarianism, the decision-making operation, and all the domestic and  
 
external realities of each single country as they contribute directly or indirectly in shaping  
 
foreign relations which are very close to the GCC security policy that is going to be highlighted  
 
shortly after. 
 
The GCC Security Policy 
 
          The creation of the GCC took place amid a series of events that threatened the security of  
 
the six small monarchies notably the Iranian Revolution and its leader Ayatollah Ruhollah 
 
Khomeini who loathed monarchies, and did not hide the desire to export his revolution across the   
 
Gulf ( Kechichian). The Iranian Revolution which was the second in the region after the Iraq 
 
1958 Revolution which destroyed monarchy, seemed more threatening according Ramazani who  
 
argues that'' the balance of forces seemed to be against the monarchical regimes in the region as  
 
both revolutions replaced monarchies with republics''(6). 
 
             The local rulers' fears reached their climax when a failed coup took place in Bahrain in 
 
1981, and Iran was accused of manipulating its nationals there along with some Bahraini  
 
sympathizers to overthrow the first monarchy in the Gulf. There were some troubles also in  
 
Saudi Arabia including the Mecca siege in 1979 by Juhayman al Utaybi and his followers, and 
 
a series of clashes in the eastern province by early 1980. 
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          These turbulent events, among others, urged Gulf leaders to look for security coordination 
 
since there was a perception of common threats looming over the monarchies ,and they had to  
 
react to ensure their survival by initiating the founding steps to create a common regional  
 
organization likely to protect them from manifold threats though the GCC charter did not  
 
mention coordination of security and foreign policy (Young 7).The GCC security policy  
 
included two types of coordination namely internal and external coordination. 
 
External security 
 
          The record of the GCC countries in terms of external security is very meager, this task has 
 
always been assigned to a foreign protector .Since 1793 Britain, which had a flourishing business  
 
with India, ensured their security. When the British decided to leave in 1971, the Gulf states had  
 
to handle this new development, their reliance on a foreign guarantor pushed them to look for  
 
another partner, and the alternative was the United States which had been already on the spot  
 
with the discovery of an ocean of oil in the region through its giant oil companies above all the 
 
Standard Oil of California (Socal) which started exploring oil in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia by  
 
early 1930's. 
 
          The British departure was filled gradually by the United Sates which concluded a series  
 
of security bilateral agreements with the GCC monarchies to use their facilities ,establish 
 
military bases ,and to ensure their defence against the neighboring powers Iran, Iraq, and the 
 
former Soviet Union following its invasion of Afghanistan. 
 
          The GCC countries tried to secure themselves by themselves, and established the  
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Peninsula Shield in 1986 in Riyadh following a meeting of the GCC chiefs of staff, it was based 
 
in Saudi Arabia near the Kuwait border; it was composed of 5,000 men. The role of this Shield 
 
was below expectations since it could not avert the Iraqi troops when they invaded Kuwait, and 
 
failed to defend the Gulf territories. Its creation was controversial; it was disbanded in 2006  
 
when contingents were sent back to their respective states. It existed for a symbolic role. 
 
           Collaboration in the realm of external defence has not moved beyond symbolism in 
 
Legrenzi's words. The GCC states did not care about external security since the protector was  
 
always there represented by the British then the US who may rely on their allies when the threat 
 
is tremendous such as the invasion of Iraq when this country claimed the possession of mass  
 
destruction and chemical weapons. The same scenario may happen if a war is launched on Iran  
 
which purports developing a nuclear program. 
 
Internal security 
 
           GCC collaboration in terms of internal cooperation is much more better, the reason behind  
 
this relative success is their share of a common objective namely the protection of their 
 
monarchial regimes to ensure their survival, so the Gulf countries collaborated very closely  
 
concerning this point which predates even the inception of the organization. Cooperation is 
 
usually carried out in an informal and bilateral way. Many bilateral agreements were signed to  
 
extract criminals, to exchange intelligence information, and to enhance border cooperation. 
 
The Gulf states are doing well in this field, but mistrust between member countries, and the 
 
opposition voiced by the liberal and Islamist Kuwaiti parliamentarians against the criminals'  
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extradition clause, under the pretext of violating the national constitution, forced internal 
 
coordination to lag behind. 
 
          In fact, the performance of GCC states either in internal or external security affairs is 
 
considerable during difficult circumstances, when they feel threatened by internal or external  
 
forces they are well united, but when “there is no perception of common threat, GCC states  
 
revert to competing among themselves”(Legrenzi11).This is well noticeable with the multiple  
 
Saudi attempts to impose its hegemony on the GCC members as the "big sister" in the region, the  
 
small Gulf often refused this tendency without being able to voice it overtly in the past for fear of 
 
a violent Saudi reaction. 
 
            However, this Saudi leadership as the international face of the GCC is waning (Young 5), 
 
and new small players namely Qatar and UAE are exploring their own leadership possibilities.  
 
Qatar has emerged as a dynamic force in the region, and has managed to play a key role on the  
 
international scene by sponsoring Arab Spring Revolutions, and mediating many struggles. 
 
          The Qatari dynamism gave birth to an open confrontation with the neighboring states  
 
which were not at ease with the new Qatari role, and attempted to curb with this remarkable  
 
activity by adopting a series of measures to isolate the Doha regime in order to reduce its activity 
 
and involvement under the pretext of non-interference in domestic affairs which culminated in 
 
the withdrawal of the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. 
 
 
Summary 
 
          This chapter explored the main driving forces which have been marking the foreign and 
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security policies  of the GCC states which had to tune them according to both internal and 
 
external realities. These realities pertained mainly to a hostile neighboring environment  
 
dominated in the past by Iraq and Iran, and a menacing internal landscape shaped by sectarian  
 
conflicts, and a complex social make-up marked by a heavy presence of expatriates. These  
 
factors among others forced the GCC states to model their foreign and security policies in line  
 
with them. This behaviour ensured their survival, but hampered their integration as it increased 
 
mistrust among member states, fuelled competition between them, and paved the way for a 
 
simmering division  which broke out when Qatar  showed its independent foreign policy, and the 
 
immediate consequence was  a tripartite withdrawal of ambassadors from Doha to force Qatar to  
 
give up with its policy in favour of change rather than status quo. 
 
          The withdrawal of the ambassadors will be the case study of the next chapter to examine in 
 
depth its reasons and  implications  in addition to the effects it has left on this young regional  
 
integration project  through  a series of interviews held with a host of experts and scholars  
 
specialized  in the Gulf region. 
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Chapter Five 
 
                                                                     Case Study 
 
 
Introduction 
 
          This chapter is the most important segment in this research project, it focuses on the latest 
 
 GCC rift to examine the organization integration by bringing the case of the ambassadors’  
 
withdrawal to a host of specialists and experts in the Gulf region during a meeting organized by  
 
the Gulf Research Center at Cambridge University to look in depth for the reasons behind this  
 
pullout, but mainly to assess the impact of this unprecedented development in the history of this  
 
regional organization. The rationale behind the choice of this meeting to carry out this case study  
 
lies in the diversity of views expected from different  analysts and scholars coming from all the 
 
GCC countries and outside the bloc. 
 
          The purpose of this chapter is to review the impact caused by this rift on the political and 
 
economic aspects, and to assess the functioning of the organization in general since the outbreak  
 
of this incident on March 5
th
2014. However, it would be more appropriate first to dig into the  
 
deep reasons of this spat before analyzing the effects it had (if it had) on the GCC functioning as  
 
well as on the different aspects of this young regional grouping. 
 
The Reasons of Withdrawal 
 
          The GCC is not unique to witness such moments of doubt, and to face setbacks and 
 
failures. In fact, all regional integration projects experienced throughout history problems and  
 
difficulties (Abdulkhaliq).These problems delayed the integration process, or even buried it at  
 
an early or advanced stage. To this effect, the European Union which is thought to be the most  
 
successful integration experience, was subject to many difficulties between member countries  
 
related to numerous issues such as sovereignty and national interests which can be illustrated, for  
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instance, by the French move in 1965 when the then French president de Gaulle stuck to his  
 
country's interests, and instructed his ministers not to take part in the EEC meetings, and caused 
 
a sort of friction among the member states as part of the famous  empty chair crisis (Europa.eu). 
 
          The GCC was not aloof from such experiences, and witnessed numerous divergences and 
 
difficulties which hindered its march including the failure of launching a common currency  
 
following a disagreement over the headquarters of the central bank, and more recently Oman’s 
 
threat to withdraw from the organization in December 2013 (Al Rasheed). However, the  
 
withdrawal of the three GCC ambassadors from Doha  in April 2014 ,was the most serious  
 
setback sustained by the organization due to its unprecedented  scope, and the heated debate it  
 
aroused over the cohesion and immunity of this regional alliance once being subject to such 
 
turbulent and unexpected circumstances. The solidity and cohesion of the GCC were seriously  
 
questionable for the first time with an utmost interest to determine the prior circumstances which 
 
paved the way for this internal split, and to assess the consequences it had on the organization. 
 
          The outbreak of the incident reflected the deep divergences already existing, notably  
 
between Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, over a number of issues at the top of them the 
 
security perception regarding political Islam. This point was "just the tip of an iceberg which 
 
hided previous disagreements especially between Saudi Arabia" and Qatar"(Krieg).Former  
 
border disputes between member countries notably between Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain  
 
were among these disagreements which fuelled tensions, and delayed the integration process. 
 
          This idea was evoked equally by David Roberts who stressed the Qatari attempt since the  
 
late 80's to escape the Saudi political orbit by forging its own independent foreign policy without  
 
paying attention to the annoyance it was causing to the neighboring kingdom. 
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          The dynamism of political Islam sparked by the Arab Spring and endorsed by Qatar, was 
 
seen by analysts, though they tended to label it differently, as the main reason of this crisis. In  
 
fact, political Islam caused a big friction among GCC countries, it was seen as a major threat by  
 
the Saudi and Emirati regimes which banned it, and curbed with its activities notably following  
 
the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which led the Saudi Kingdom to blacklist the 
 
Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization (Ajbaili), while Qatar showed more sympathy  
 
with this political trend by offering shelter to some of its key figures such Al Qaradawi and  
 
Khaled Mashaal, or by helping Islamic movements elsewhere in the Arab World notably in  
 
Tunisia and Egypt.  
 
          Therefore, the GCC countries cooperated with regard to the Arab Spring by offering moral  
 
and financial support to the Arab peoples who went against their regimes, and even intervened  
 
militarily notably Qatar which sent its troops to Libya to speed up the fall of the former regime  
 
led by colonel Al Gaddafi. The GCC countries' cooperation with the Arab Spring movements  
 
was very noticeable, though it occurred with different levels ranging from moral support to  
 
military intervention, however, their attitude vis-a-vis political Islam was quite different due to  
 
their perception of this notion which reached a contradiction level; the Saudi and Emirati regimes  
 
deemed this political trend as a threat to the survival of their monarchial systems, and did not  
 
hesitate to ban it, while Qatar had a different vision with regard to political Islam, and showed  
 
 
more sympathy and help to this trend. This tolerant attitude with political Islam angered the  
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officialdom of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi who decided to adopt a common harsh stand with Qatar  
 
which did not share the same perception, and displeased them by breaking the status quo rule  
 
commonly respected by the GCC monarchies. 
 
           The following table sums up the different views and opinions related to the genesis of the  
 
diplomatic spat between Qatar and the three GCC countries. 
  
 
Scholar Institution Context Reason of withdrawal 
Saud  Al Tamamy King Saud 
University 
GRC 2014 Qatar strengthening 
of Muslim 
Brotherhood 
Andreas Krieg King's College 
London 
GRC 2014 it is an ideological 
move  against the 
Muslim Brotherhood 
David Roberts King's College 
London 
GRC 2014 they are taking 
extremely hard line 
on the ikhwan 
Abdul khaliq 
Abdulla 
 
UAE University On phone Qatar failed to fulfill 
promises 
Fahd Al Sumait Kuwait 
University 
GRC 2014 Unsuccessful  attempt 
to exert some control 
on Qatar 
David Goldfischer Korbel School 
of International 
Studies 
GRC2014 The  deepest 
immediate issue is the 
support of Qatar for 
the Muslim 
brotherhood 
GerdNonneman Georgetown 
University 
GRC 2014 the Qatari foreign 
policy particularly 
over the different 
perceptions of what 
the Muslim Brother 
hood 
Leah Sherwood 
 
Khalifa 
University .UAE 
GRC 2014 The prominent reason 
probably relates to 
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the activist  foreign 
policy of Qatar 
Jassim Hussain Ex-University of 
Bahrain 
GRC 2014 There are differences 
in foreign policies 
objectives 
Jean Marc Rickli King's College 
London 
GRC 2014 Different  vision of 
political Islam 
between Qatar and 
the 3 countries 
Said al Saqri 
 
Advisor to 
Oman's 
government 
GRC 2014 power struggle 
between Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar 
 
 
          The table above which recapitulates the different views as regards the motives of this 
 
 move, indicates that the reason behind the outbreak of this rift lies in the activist foreign policy 
 
of Qatar which displeased Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states tagging along namely Bahrain and  
 
the UAE which "had always been in favour of status quo, and against any change that would  
 
jeopardize the survival of their own regimes"(Al Saqri). In fact, these fears can be justified with  
 
 a brief look at the history of this region which witnessed two major changes, and both of them  
 
undermined the established status quo namely the Iraqi revolution of 1958, and the Iranian  
 
revolution which ended up with the fall of monarchies and the establishment of republics.   
 
           Despite the terminological differences between interviewees, the cause of this 
 
unprecedented row is the same namely Qatar's active foreign policy; it is labeled differently, it is  
 
referred to as political Islam, the Ikhwan or Muslim Brotherhood, power struggle and so on, but  
 
it remains the common denominator for this political friction within the GCC. Far from the  
 
lexical difference, Qatar's support for the new political trend which swept the Arab World turned  
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dramatically the course in many Arab countries which had to look for other alternatives to  
 
maintain the situation. 
           
          In fact, Qatar has become in the recent years very dynamic in terms of foreign policy, it 
 
has involved itself heavily on the international scene especially with the inception of the Arab  
 
Spring Revolutions during which it was the major player, it backed the Jasmine Revolution  
 
which kicked out president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, and helped the Islamist Al  
 
Nahdha movement to maintain its grip on this North African country. The Qatari support for the  
 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was undeniable either materially or morally via Aljazeera  
 
Channel which boosted the morale of the Egyptian protestors, and offered them the opportunity  
 
to air their views and ideas. The same move was adopted with Libya where the Qatari special 
 
forces were seen in the front lines in the final assault on Al Gaddafi 's Bab al Aziziya compound  
 
on August 24 (Roberts). 
 
          This remarkable Qatari dynamism in support of change represented by emerging Islamist  
 
regimes mainly in Tunisia and Egypt in addition to Turkey displeased Saudi Arabia and the UAE  
 
which "perceived political Islam as a direct threat to their survival"(Goldfischer ). The two states  
 
along with Bahrain tried to force Qatar, led by a freshly installed young Emir, to give up its  
 
policy of supporting the change movement, but they  dramatically failed with the king father  
 
Hamad Bin Khalifa. Saudi Arabia and its allies, asked Qatar, via the GCC in a meeting held on 
 
November 23
rd
 2013 in Riyadh, to review its foreign policy by signing a security agreement to be 
 
implemented within a given timetable, and when Doha did not put into effect this agreement, the  
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three states announced in a joint statement the withdrawal of their ambassadors from Doha to put  
 
more pressure on Qatar to comply with the Riyadh Pact which mainly called for non-interference  
 
in domestic affairs of each single GCC state as well as the preservation of regional security. 
 
          This move is thought to have an impact on the GCC integration that we are going to  
 
examine hereafter in details mainly in terms of the organization functioning, the political leg,  
 
and other aspects related to the economic and social fields. 
 
The Functioning of the GCC 
 
          The GCC functions via many institutions starting from the supreme council till the small  
 
technical agencies which run and regulate daily the different tasks entrusted with. Shortly before 
 
the end of the crisis, and the comeback of the withdrawn ambassadors to Doha, the debate was  
 
still going on whether the organization functioned normally, or it was affected by the incident. 
 
          In fact, there are two major tendencies regarding the GCC functioning after the pullout of  
 
the ambassadors from Doha; the first trend indicates that the GCC was not affected by this rift,  
 
not because of the solidity and soundness of the organization or its strong institutions which  
 
could take out the GCC from troubled waters to safe shores, but due to the fact that it is just an  
 
imagined community which does not actually exist according to Andreas Krieg who claims that " 
 
the reason behind the rise of this loose organization has ceased to exist", it emerged to face up to  
 
the Iranian threat which he believes that it does not represent any threat now to the organization. 
 
He further argues that GCC is jeopardized now by internal conflicts which the organization has  
 
not been able to work out common strategies to face up or tackle. 
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          However, the developments taking place in the region after the Iranian revolution   
 
contradict Krieg's analysis, because Iran still represents a serious threat for the GCC regimes  
 
which keep stressing this menace in each communiqué culminating their regular or extraordinary  
 
summits, and call Teheran to stop its attempts of interfering in the GCC affairs directly or via  
 
manipulating its nationals living in the GCC states. 
 
            More or less, the same idea is endorsed by David Roberts who claims that "the GCC  
 
which had rarely been a cohesive organization, had never functioned that well". Therefore, the  
 
functioning of the GCC was not affected because it had always been a dysfunctional unit (Al  
 
Sumait). 
 
          In fact, this approach gets its strength and validity from the record of the organization  
 
which had never been a unified front politically, economically, and certainly militarily 
 
(Sherwood). The organization could not ward off the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, or acted as a one  
 
block when negotiating with the EU to conclude an FTA. Furthermore, its foreign policy has not  
 
been common, it lacked cohesion and coordination, and  could not behave as a common  
 
interlocutor when dealing with key issues at the international level, their position vis-à-vis the  
 
Egyptian change of power is a good illustrative example of a fragmented foreign policy with  
 
Qatar supporting ousted President Morsi, while the UAE, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia backing the  
 
new military regime led by President Al Sisi. 
 
          The supporters of this trend conclude that "the spat could not break something already  
 
broken" (Sherwood). They argue that the GCC coordinates better "when there is an external  
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threat such as the Iranian Revolution which united the GCC states, and urged them to found the  
 
organization in 1981"(Krieg). The remake of this union and harmony have become possible  
 
nowadays because another external menace which began to loom over the region namely the  
 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant also known by the Arabic acronym Da’esh according 
 
always to Andrias Krieg . 
 
          In fact, this argument seems to be very valid since Saudi Arabia is building up its forces to  
 
fight this jihadist group which threatens the security and stability of the region. In this 
 
connection, the GCC states notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait have taken the necessary  
 
measures to secure their borders, and to ward off potential attacks by Da’esh which has become, 
 
therefore, a unifying factor, and has improved the performance of the GCC at least in the security  
 
field. 
           As a matter of fact, the arguments evoked by these scholars are very pertinent since the  
 
 GCC did not achieve considerable results in terms of economic integration, and its political 
 
cooperation is still very loose despite the numerous assets it has as being a strategic sub-region in 
 
the Middle East, and its huge energy and financial capacities which could have allowed the  
 
organization to take the lead on the international scene as a key decision-maker with more  
 
coordination and less jealousy for national sovereignty. However, the GCC has not fallen apart,  
 
it still does exist, and it is expected to have learnt from this lesson, and to be more cautious in its  
 
future decisions to avoid such unnecessary troubles which have nearly blown up the whole  
 
integration project. 
 
          The second trend believes that the organization has been affected at the higher level that's 
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to say the political level (Abdulkhaliq ),while the lower technical cooperation continued to work  
 
almost in a normal way as the small agencies have kept holding their meetings (Nonneman). 
 
          In fact, the political leg is highly important in the functioning of an organization like the  
 
GCC which is a hybrid organization (Legrenzi 42). The decision-making within the GCC is a top  
 
down process, it stems from the rulers who are the main players if not the unique, they can  
 
approve or disapprove decisions individually without involving the other political or social 
 
 partners unlike the other integration organizations where the margin left to technocrats and  
 
experts is considerably important. 
 
           The lack of institutional mechanisms to protect the running of the organization "put it at  
 
the mercy of the leadership in each country, they can soar any relationship if they feel ill at ease" 
 
(Al Saqri), and this what happened exactly with the rulers of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain  
 
when they felt that their own regimes are in threat. Therefore, this unprecedented storm had to 
 
leave an impact on the political aspect of the GCC organization which had already been fragile, 
 
and became more fragile ( Krieg). 
 
          In fact, this incident allowed the simmering problems between member states, only known  
 
before by followers of the GCC politics, to erupt and to be noticeable to ordinary people 
 
according to Goldfischer who argued that it would have caused a deep division within the GCC 
 
if one of the parties at loggerheads did not change its position. 
 
          The split among the GCC caused by the ambassadors' withdrawal showed the organization 
 
 " weaker than its leaders sometimes try to portrait themselves"(Nonneman). Their hidden  
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divisions in the past became very apparent, and this fact had an impact on their foreign  
 
relations. To highlight the impact of incident, Nonneman states the example of USA which tries  
 
to make the GCC into a more cohesive defence partner which takes its share in regional security 
 
responsibility, he views the achievement of this mission as very difficult following the effects of 
 
this move : 
 
                 if they want to supply them with a missile defence system and so on, 
 
                 they want it to be done in a way that, it is not just six little individual 
 
                 states without coordination , it needs a regional based missile defence 
 
                 structure, with this rift happening, that kind of projects becomes more 
 
                 difficult. In fact, it becomes virtually impossible, in that sense, what 
 
                 happened, further stepped back the GCC unity. 
 
          This incident further deepened the lack of trust between member states (Al Tamamy), and 
 
deteriorated more bilateral relations between GCC states especially between Qatar and the UAE  
 
which were the worst affected due to a vociferous reaction adopted by Abu Dhabi during the  
 
crisis according to David Roberts who believes that the UAE's demands were irrational and  
 
motivated by a security paranoia over political Islam. In fact, the Qatari-Emirati relationship  
 
had begun to strain before mainly following the critical remarks made by Yusuf Al Qaradawi, a 
 
Doha based Egyptian cleric, who condemned in one of his Friday's speeches the Emirati support  
 
for the military regime in Egypt, in addition to complaints about Aljazeera dealing with news  
 
related to the federal government of Abu Dhabi  the latest of them the Channel's coverage of  
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Gaza war where Aljazeera accused the UAE of financing Israel (Gulfnews.com). 
 
          Moreover, the incident showed also the GCC a fragmented union, and downsized Qatar 
 
according to Saud Al Tamamy who stressed the consequences of the incident mainly on Qatar: 
 
                 it gave the world, and the Arab world in particular, a strong signal 
 
                 that Qatar's foreign policy is not backed by its neighbors, and therefore, 
 
                 it may not be sustainable, so Qatar is an unsustainable player, a player 
 
                 that may not continue the same pace, it reduces the confidence in Qatar's 
 
                 long term commitments to its allies outside the GCC, so I think all Qatar's 
 
                 allies outside have realized that what Qatar is doing may not be forever, 
 
                 and there will be a time where Qatar has to adjust or make a U turn . 
 
          However, this view does not sound solid since Qatar remained active in the international  
 
arena, and managed to release a US hostage from the captivity of a Al Qaeda-linked group in  
 
Syria. Qatar was even consulted, according to Fox news, for several times in an effort to secure a 
 
lasting cease-fire in Gaza taking profit of its excellent relationship with Hamas.  
 
           The most important of all, according Said Al Saqri who indicated, in an interview held  
 
with him before the return of the ambassadors, that Qatar did not respond to the three countries'  
 
demands as Aljazeera continued to function with the same editorial line which depicted  
 
unfavorably the Egyptian regime, which meant that Qatar was asserting its independence from  
 
Saudi Arabia thanks to its financial power which allowed it to play that game (Al Saqri). 
 
          Of course, the financial soundness is very important in shaping the state's position, but it is  
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not the unique factor in foreign relations as many countries are very rich, but their role in the  
 
international arena is very limited which denotes that Qatar's dynamism is not linked only to its 
 
financial power. 
 
The Economic Impact 
 
          The political aspect was, according to Nonneman and Abdulkhaliq, the most affected by  
 
this diplomatic row since the other technical agencies continued to work almost in a normal way, 
 
and held regularly their meetings without being banned or bullied by the high ranking  
 
institutions, for instance, days after the failure of the Jeddah meeting to bring back the 
 
ambassadors to Doha, the GCC Labour ministers and other stakeholders met on September 13
th
 
 
in Oman to evaluate available data in the GCC countries, and to strengthen the technical capacity 
 
of the staff of national statistical agencies(Times of oman.com). 
 
          However, the top down making-decision process, could, by no means, avert the GCC 
 
economic aspect from the aftermath of this diplomatic incident. Figures published hours after 
 
the withdrawal, showed that the market indexes in Qatar and the three other countries went down  
 
with different rates. (Al Arabiya.net). 
 
 
Qatar  market  index -3% 
Kuwait  market index - 0,7% 
Dubai market index -0,5% 
Saudi Arabia market  index -0,2% 
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          This table shows the immediate impact of the ambassadors' withdrawal on the GCC 
 
economies. These numbers indicate that Qatar’s index was down by 3 percent at around 9.30  
 
GMT, while Other Gulf stock markets dropped by much smaller margins: Kuwait’s benchmark  
 
fell by 0.7 percent; Dubai’s index slipped 0.5 percent, and Saudi Arabia’s was down 0.2 percent  
 
at the same time. Qatar was, therefore, the biggest loser despite its huge financial soundness with  
 
a budget surplus amounting to 40 billion Riyal ($10.7 billion). The strong financial position of 
 
Qatar made the impact much lesser. However, if the situation continued for a longer time, Qatar's 
 
private businesses would bear heavy losses at many levels. This comes when Qatar is carrying  
 
out projects worth $42 billion in preparation for the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and could lead to a  
 
rise in its foreign debt up to 86 per cent of GDP, according to the International Monetary Fund  
 
(IMF), which means that this dispute is untimely for Qatar (Al Asoomi).  
 
          There were fears of a possible closure of the Saudi-Qatari border if the dispute continued. 
 
This move is thought to be very harmful for Qatar's economy which relies heavily on this route 
 
for trade, as the CNN reported figures emanating from the Ministry of Development Planning  
 
and Statistics in Qatar that around 80% of dairy imports, 30% of stone and cement imports and  
 
92% of aluminum imports come across the land border. 
 
          Another consequence could have appeared if the situation was not redressed; if Oman was 
 
convinced by the trio to join their alliance, and Qatar resorted to stopping its gas supplies to the  
 
GCC countries, Oman would be the worst affected because it depends on this for some industries  
 
(Al Asoomi). In fact, this idea does not seem well grounded since Oman was not part of the  
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dispute, and it is not easily influenced  by the GCC countries, it has its own foreign policy based 
 
on excellent relations with the United States and Iran with which it is bound with geography and 
 
common interests (Saeed). 
 
          These few examples show that the economic aspect was relatively affected by the dispute,  
 
however, it was expected to witness further consequences if the situation was not contained by  
 
Qatar and the other three GCC countries. 
 
Other Consequences 
 
          The withdrawal did not only cause tensions between states, it sparked also a harsh 
 
campaign between GCC citizens through social media mainly Facebook and Twitter which went 
 
beyond its role of connecting people to becoming a political platform through which people 
 
exchanged provocative remarks, and they used even foul language (Peninsula.com). 
 
            The campaign witnessed even the participation of non-GCC citizens who stressed the  
 
weakness of the organization, and expressed the hope for the return of the ambassadors. The  
 
move escalated when officials involved themselves including  Dahi Khalfan, vice chair of Dubai  
 
police, who made provocative remarks against Qatar on his Twitter account  by calling it  
 
''the eighth emirate of the UAE''. This remark outraged, according to the Peninsula newspaper,  
 
some Qataris who filed a complaint against Dahi Khalfan. The reason behind this cyber war  
 
according to the Qatari writer and social media activist Faisal Al Marzooki, who was quoted by  
 
the above-mentioned newspaper, is the lack of diplomatic solutions that led to more involvement  
 
of citizens in this social media campaign which further deteriorated relations between GCC  
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peoples. 
 
          The pullout led also some Saudi and Emirati journalists and writers to end their  
 
relationship with some Qatari media outlets such as Saudi columnist Samar Al Mogren who 
 
announced on her Twitter account that the Saudi ministry of culture had decided to end  
 
collaboration of  Saudi writers with Qatari newspapers (Thomas). Other famous Emirati sports 
  
commentators are said to have quit beIN SPORTS  and Al Kass Channels following this spat. 
 
             In fact, these are minor consequences, and can be considered as isolated events since a 
 
considerable number of GCC journalists remained hired by Qatari media outlets based in Doha,  
 
or collaborated from their native countries without seeing their accreditations cancelled or  
 
confiscated by the respective information ministries which means that relations in this field were 
 
not so strained. 
 
summary 
 
          The crisis is finally over, and its impact remained limited so far, it affected some aspects of  
 
the organization, most importantly the political leg which is undeniable as we have seen in the 
 
discussion, and how it impacted the running of the organization. However, the consequences of 
 
the incident were expected to be more serious if the situation was not solved, and the two sides 
 
stuck to their positions without making concessions, and its spillover effects would become 
 
greater to include other aspects that could step back this regional integration project after only 
 
33 years of existence mainly because of the ambassadors' pullout from Doha. 
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Chapter Six 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
          As we have seen in the discussion, the withdrawal of the ambassadors from Qatar has had 
 
an impact on the GCC integration, it has affected some of its aspects at different levels notably  
 
the political leg which was the most impacted due to the nature of the organization and its  
 
decision-taking  process. The damage is recognized even by GCC politicians including a Kuwaiti  
 
official who required anonymity “This is by far the biggest crisis we've encountered as a 
 
council’’(Aljazeera.com). 
 
          The settlement of the crisis seemed to be very complicated over the past few months due to 
 
Qatar's commitment not to change its foreign policy as it was clearly indicated by the foreign  
 
minister Khalid al-Attiyah during his visit to France last August “The independence of Qatar's  
 
foreign policy is simply non-negotiable’’( Aljazeera.com). For their part, the three countries 
 
were very determined that Qatar should fully comply with the Riyadh agreement before sending 
 
back their ambassadors back to Doha. 
 
          The deadlock, which has already hampered the good and smooth running of the GCC, is 
 
now over, the three countries decided to send back their ambassadors to Doha after an 
 
extraordinary meeting held by the GCC leaders  in Riyadh in mid-November 2014, signaling an  
 
end to an eight-month rift over Doha's support for Islamist groups (Reuters.com). The final 
 
statement issued by the GCC said that the Riyadh meeting reached what it described as “an 
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understanding meant to turn a new page in relations between the six members of the Gulf  
 
organization''. 
 
          The statement did give not give further details about the brokered deal, or the concessions 
 
made by Qatar, however, diplomats in Doha said that amongst other  things, Qatar had promised 
 
the UAE that the Brotherhood would not be allowed to operate  from the country (Reuters.com). 
 
          The meeting was seen as a last ditch attempt to contain the situation, and to secure the 
 
holding of the group's summit planned in Doha in December because a month earlier a GCC  
 
foreign ministers meeting scheduled in the Qatari capital was postponed highlighting the  
 
continued discord  according to the Emirati newspaper the National which revealed that tensions 
 
had grown to the point that some speculated that the Doha summit might be held in Saudi Arabia  
 
or Kuwait instead of Qatar (The national.ae). 
 
          The meeting was described as a success by the Emirati foreign minister who tweeted that 
 
"Gulf leaders had “succeeded in taking responsibility, and had made the stability and prosperity  
 
of the region, and the interests of its people  the priority'' (qtd in. the national.ae). 
 
          As a matter of fact, Qatar has certainly honored some of the Riyadh engagements, though 
 
not confirmed, but the current situation in the region marked by the advance of Da'esh , has also 
 
helped the GCC leaders to look for this option  as it is hinted in the Riyadh statement “a new  
 
page that will present a strong base, especially in light of the sensitive circumstances the region  
 
is undergoing”.   
 
          The reinstatement of the ambassadors put an end to a gloomy period in the GCC history, 
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which led to a considerable  deterioration  in relations between Doha  and the other three  
 
capitals as Saudi Arabia and its allies kept trying to isolate Qatar according to AbdulKhaliq who 
 
believes that the Emirati-Qatari relations were the most affected by the crisis. However, the 
 
union has not fallen apart, and what has been going must not transcend a “family matter” asserts 
 
Tariq Al Maeena since “the union is still tightly bonded by a common people with family ties  
 
with each other, and that family spat would eventually be sorted out to address the concerns of  
 
all its members” (Gulfnews.com).This argument is taken up by other scholars such as Jamal  
 
Abdulla who confirms that the demonization of Qatar's role is poor “given the Gulf States’  
 
Geographic proximity and the family cohesion of their peoples which forms somewhat of a  
 
safeguard against this demonization”(6.7).This analysis seems to be logical and realistic, the  
 
settlement of the dispute has provided more evidence about the GCC ability to diffuse its internal  
 
tensions as it was the case with past border disputes .  
 
          This ''new page'' as termed by the Riyadh communiqué has avoided the GCC from falling  
 
apart, but the withdrawal had some negative consequences “it will delay the proposed union by a 
 
decade or two'' according to Joseph Kechichian (Aljazeera.com). At the economic level, the  
 
crisis could have had serious consequences especially on Doha if the deadlock continued due to  
 
the overreliance of Qatar on Saudi Arabia which represents, as we have seen in the discussion, an  
 
important gateway for Qatar ( Al Saqri). In fact, Qatar's massive dependence on foodstuffs  
 
coming from Saudi Arabia and the UAE could have left it vulnerable ( Kholaif). Official figures  
 
released by the Qatari institutions, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, confirm this reality . 
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          All in all, the GCC row, though it is over now, made the organization more fragile, and  
 
stepped back the group unity (Nonneman), there is now a tremendous problem of trust among 
 
member states following Qatar's failure to honour the engagements it announced during the  
 
Riyadh meeting in 2013. 
 
          To conclude, the withdrawal had an impact on the GCC integration process which  
 
remained limited, but it could have widened to include further aspects that would threaten the 
 
expected union if the parties at issue camped to their positions, and would, therefore, miss a good  
 
opportunity of a solid regional integration. 
 
          Finally, it is worth mentioning that this research paper is a mere humble attempt to  
 
examine a new phenomenon  in the history of GCC, which deserves more academic studies and  
 
analyses by fully fledged researchers who can provide more evidence on this incident which  
 
risked to blow up this integration experience in the Arabia. The thesis has provided evidence that 
 
the GCC dispute has indeed affected the integration of the organization, and has determined the 
 
different aspects impacted by the withdrawal crisis. It could serve as a springboard for further 
 
researches since the road map is already outlined, and the damage is highlighted.  
 
          On the basis of this thesis, future researchers may profit from the different views evoked  
 
by experts throughout the study to concentrate on particular points and aspects which need more  
 
spotlight following the comeback of the ambassadors to Doha who may give further indications  
 
about their move, and may assess in concrete figures the damage felt by the GCC after eight  
 
months of dispute. 
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                  Interview questions 
 
1    Why the withdrawal happened? 
 
2    What are the reasons for this withdrawal? 
 
3    How do explain it? 
 
4   What do you think of the Qatari reaction? 
 
5   Did the withdrawal affect the functioning of the GCC bodies? 
 
6   Did the withdrawal affect the GCC integration process? 
 
7   Was there any foreign pressure? 
 
8   What impact can this move have on the GCC? 
 
9   How do you see the future of this regional organization? 
 
10 Would this move force the GCC countries to be more cautious in 
 
     their future decisions? 
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      Interview answers 
 
1-  Saud al tamamy 
 
Why withdrawal happened? 
 
          Some GCC countries have discovered that Qatar is conducting a foreign policy that runs  
 
against the interests of these three specific countries, it is very clear that the two remaining  
 
countries Kuwait and Oman are endorsing what three countries have done through their silent  
 
approval. They did not object this, and I think that Qatar conducted a foreign policy that aims at  
 
strengthening Muslim Brotherhood in a way which runs against the threat perception by some  
 
other GCC countries which believe that Qatar has some unnecessary contacts with some groups  
 
within these countries. There is also some complaints from Bahrain in particular about  
 
nationalization. The biggest problem, on the top of that   there is a grooming lack of trust  
 
between these countries and Qatar because as far as I know Qatar vowed to do A, and B and C,  
 
but suddenly they do not honor  what they agreed to do. So there is a structural problem 
 
of trust, in addition to that there are specific issues of meddling within these countries and 
 
harming their interests in the wider Middle East 
 
Has Egypt a bearing in this move? 
 
          I think Egypt has not played a role in blackmailing Qatar. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the  
 
UAE do need Egypt to tell them what to do, however, I am sure there some intelligence reports  
 
from Egypt about some interference, but you did not need that. You need just to watch Qatari 
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sponsored media to know there some sort of provocation coming from Qatar about some settings  
 
in Egypt and other countries 
 
Did this affect the GCC functioning? 
 
          When the GCC was founded, no one believed that GCC will trouble free organization.  
 
everybody as a group of six countries   believed in the six countries believed there would  
 
differences, differences in calculation, in threat perceptions, in domestic politics, in international  
 
relations and so on, this recent problem is unprecedented in terms of its scale however, it is still a  
 
milestone that GCC has passed many milestones before. In a way it is a problem within the 
 
GCC, and it shows that there is some sort of institutional failures within the GCC, but at the  
 
same time, as any problem has happened before, the GCC will pass it with some arrangement,  
 
and with commitment offered by all GCC countries to continue the march towards further 
 
integration 
 
Did this affect the GCC inter-state relations and their foreign relations as well? 
 
         As prince Saud Al Faycal said, he is not happy about what happened between Saudi Arabia  
 
and Qatar, it affected international relations within the GCC. It downsize Qatar, it gave the world  
 
and the Arab World in particular a strong signal that Qatar's foreign policy is not backed by its  
 
neighbours, and therefore, it may not be sustainable, so Qatar unsustainable player, a player that  
 
may not continue the same pace, it reduces the confidence Qatar's long term commitments to its  
 
allies outside the GCC, so I think all Qatar's allies outside have realized that what Qatar is doing 
 
may not be forever , and there will be a time where Qatar has to adjust or make a U turn as 
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some suggest .so in either way Qatar will not stay as it is for the shorter. 
 
Dou you think the GCC countries will be cautious in their future decisions to avoid such  
 
drifts? 
 
          There will more calculated moves, they will need more coordinated foreign policy, we  
 
today Saudi and UAE consul, which a good step in Saudi and UAE foreign policy at least for the  
 
short run. Also see GCC is trying to move towards a greater integration or union. 
 
What do you of Qatar's reaction? 
 
          I think Qatar tries to separate Saudi Arabia from the UAE; they try to appease Saudi  
 
Arabia, of course Saudi Arabia helped a lot Qatar in terms they did not launch a media  
 
campaign, which is a wise decision. Qatar responded positively to that development, but what  
 
could be seen as a negative development was the mutual media campaign between Qatar and the  
 
UAE, which is painful in my point of view. The Qatari complaints to attempts that they have  
 
agreed to is very slow in my point of view; Aljazeera is still advocating instability in Egypt, it  
 
has become softer towards Saudi Arabia, but this is not the biggest achievement, Qatar has  
 
refrained from nationalizing Bahrainis, but the big things like allegations of supporting  
 
extremism in Syria or Iraq is still there, what happened in Gaza, Qatar is still resisting the  
 
Egyptian initiative. Qatar tries to appease, in a way, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain but did not do a  
 
lot with UAE, they did not change their strategies in the whole region yet, we did not see that. 
 
How do you see the future of the GCC? 
 
          I expect that the GCC has to decide whether it will create a coordinated foreign policy or  
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whether it will try to move on two speeds or two wheels. That some countries will be 
 
coordinating their policies with each other including Saudi Arabia , Bahrain, Kuwait,  the UAE,   
 
possibly Oman at some point, and in which Qatar could be the odd man in the GCC. Something I  
 
do not want to see. So think now the ball is in the Qatar side, and the Qataris have to decide by  
 
themselves whether to be part of a bigger regional bloc with a  coordinated foreign  policy, or be  
 
allied to far away countries that might not come to help them when which is unnatural by any  
 
foreign policy standard 
 
You want to add something? 
 
          We should focus on the competition between the five GCC countries minus Saudi Arabia.  
 
Many literature focuses on the so called Saudi hegemony on the GCC countries while actually it  
 
is not that, the other five GCC countries compete with each other , there is a shadowed   
 
competition between the other GCC countries, some of them voted for hosting the central bank  
 
by Riyadh, others voted for Abu Dhabi, it was a Saudi decision. 
 
2 - Andreas Krieg 
 
Why the withdrawal happened? 
 
          It is a message of disagreement of foreign policy of the GCC about the Arab Spring, it is  
 
mostly about the GCC countries under the Saudi leadership particularly the UAE and Bahrain.  
 
All three of them are convinced that the sovereignty of its member states is the most important  
 
aspect of the GCC,  that we should respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of their states,  
 
for them, it is an ideological move against the Muslim Brotherhood I think, they are paranoid and  
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irrational about how to deal with political Islam especially the UAE which has a paranoia when it  
 
comes to political Islam , and they want to show Qatar that Qatar's foreign policy of supporting  
 
political Islam across the Arab world after the Arab Spring has been counter-productive to  
 
regime security, their own regime security, so the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain see political  
 
Islam as a threat to their own regime security, Qatar is one that supports political Islam in  
 
countries such Egypt Libya and Syria, they want to send a strong message that they disagree with  
 
that foreign policy stand of Qatar by saying if you support political Islam you against les raisons  
 
d'état of each single state which are Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain. 
 
Why this particular time? 
 
        This is just the tip of the iceberg, this a gradual process which erupted in February this year,  
 
I think the internal discussions and disagreements have been going really for a long time within 
 
the GCC, also I think it has something to do with the fact  Sheikh Tamim who has took over last 
 
summer 2013, I think they tried to intimidate the young Emir, to show him we can put pressure  
 
on you, and we want you to change your foreign policy which is something that was easy under   
 
Sheikh Hamad. I think Sheikh Tamim did very well by responding to this threat by not  
 
responding to the threat, continuing the policy as normal , not reacting to any of the demands that  
 
were completely irrational I think, I think Qatar and Tamim came out of the crisis relatively well. 
 
Most people in the international community particularly in the west would say the UAE and 
 
Saudi Arabia were irrational with the demands, Qatar has not responded, and now has been  
 
resolved, and Saudi Arabia and UAE have not achieved what they demanded. 
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Do you think this policy will force the young emir to change his policy? 
 
          like I said before, the demands were to stop Aljazeera  from functioning close, this did not 
 
happen, this is the sovereignty of Qatar, and they do not  want it to be dictated from outside, 
 
Sheikh Tamim said that Qatar is not meddling in domestic policies of its neighboring 
 
countries. The Qatari government has been very good, Sheikh Tamim has not reacted to which  
 
was the right thing to do, I think he is not going to react, the demands are very irrational, when  
 
they talk about not meddling in internal affairs, it's a very vague ambiguous statement, and  
 
nobody knows what they mean by this, they have not given any fact. On top of this, as we know  
 
now with the intervention in Libya by the UAE, it's quite clear that the UAE do not stick to this 
 
particular maxim of their foreign policy, there is a double standard, on the one hand people are 
 
saying you are not allowed to intervene, yet we are allowed to intervene. There is good  
 
intervention which supports the idea of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain  and UAE which intervention  
 
against Islamism, but when Qatar intervenes to support people that deem to be representative of  
 
the people as soon as this happen, people say this a bad intervention. Intervention on behalf of  
 
political Islam is bad, against political Islam is good. I think this is a very irrational way from  
 
UAE and Saudi Arabia to deal with Qatar. 
 
What is the impact on GCC functioning? 
 
          GCC is an imagined community, it is less than imagined community, it does not actually  
 
exist, it is a loose community of states that have positioned itself vis-a-vis the perceived threat of  
 
Iran, this threat diminished at the moment, the current threats that these countries are facing  
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probably are more domestic threats, and they define and approach these domestic threats in  
 
different ways, so the common denominator that united these countries has ceased to exist, so we  
 
have on a one hand Oman which has independent relations with Iran, had in the past relations  
 
with Israel, and we have Qatar who is trying to have relations with Iran or any country or any  
 
country in the region, it is a very pragmatic approach, Kuwait which takes a different stance to  
 
UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain when it comes to domestic and security. So we have a rift in the  
 
GCC. The unity that was always fragile has become more fragile. So can we go forward with  
 
this? They are trying to integrate the military command, this s a great initiative, whether will  
 
actually happen we do not know this is  a little initiative to save the GCC, but  I think the most   
 
fundamental problem is a massive  rift in foreign policy, which I think they cannot overcome  
 
especially with the UAE which is the one to blame it  has been completely irrational  and guided  
 
by a  security paranoia 
 
How do you see the future? 
 
          It depends if there someone who can take the lead and bring them altogether, they have to  
 
make a compromise, UAE will never take the lead, it has been irrational, may be Saudi Arabia to  
 
some extent has relatively to the UAE  a better relationship with, and also culturally closer to the  
 
Qataris. I think the Saudis have to play a role in reuniting the GCC. A common threat could  
 
unite the GCC, and brings them together, a common policy and a common stance  could be  
 
against Daesh. If the GCC can take a common stance in fighting Daesh, the GCC might be safe  
 
because the GCC need a factor against which to negatively integrate, and this negative  
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integration factor may be Daesh 
 
3- David Roberts 
 
why the withdrawal ? 
 
          It shows that they are talking extremely hard line on the ikhwan when it does seem to  
 
reflect the reality of the situation, they have the information that we do not have, it is difficult to  
 
see or understand the gravity of the situation as they see it. GCC is a very troubled organization.  
 
This group of states has so much in common, but they disagree, this is the latest issue that  
 
highlights their problem. 
 
Was there any pressure from Egypt? 
 
          it is not about Ikhawan, of course is very important strategic problem between the two, but  
 
is also about how does its business which is to say how Qatar arranges the release of hostages in  
 
Syria, or what Qatar does in Yemen, or how Qatar naturalizes other GCC citizens, it is about a  
 
lot of things, but of course the Muslim Brotherhood political issue is first and foremost of all, the  
 
Aljazeera Arabic still refers unfavorably to the new government in Egypt and that kinds of  
 
things, this is may be that was the straw that broke the camel's back, may be king Abdullah  
 
Salah, it is about a range of issues. 
 
did this affect GCC functioning? 
 
          No, GCC is not functioning that well, it has never functioned that well, it is good in getting  
 
that boring technical requirement about inter regional postage or small things like that, the GCC  
 
has rarely been cohesive organization, during time, it has been cohesive is when there is a real  
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serious external pressure especially Iran of course, and we have the US led rapprochement, you  
 
need a huge amount of political maturity or concern threat to overcome the small differences,  
 
narcissism of small differences. 
 
what do you think of the Qatari reaction and the other GCC countries? 
 
          Qatar was quite mature statement like in its reaction, within the Diwan they were  
 
concerned and eager to get consult, but they did the right thing by not over reacting, Emirate  
 
people were astonished by the vociferousness of Abu Dhabi led reaction. 
 
Would GCC be more cautious? 
 
          Yes and no, Qatar would look for ways to, looks for ways not to make worse, de- escalate  
 
the situation, but at the same time, Qatar has a foreign policy, a certain orientation for the twenty  
 
years or in some the 50 years, so it is not going to change, the most important cannot be bullied  
 
into changing its fundamental foreign policy, the new Emir, 34 old now, cannot be bullied into  
 
making a huge change in his foreign policy, it cannot be done the public will not stand it. 
 
4 - Abdukhaleq Abdullah 
 
Why the withdrawal? 
 
          The central reason has promised few things and signed a document that it will fulfill  
 
promises and when it failed to do so the three countries decided to recall their ambassadors, it is  
 
a bunch of promises that Qatar was supposed to deliver, and failed to deliver that caused the  
 
withdrawal of the ambassadors. 
 
Did this affect the functioning of GCC? 
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          Of course, it did, it would be silly to say it did not, it affected the political leg of the GCC  
 
more than the other aspects of the GCC. The GCC has many legs, the economic, the social, the  
 
cultural, the security, most of them have functioned well during the crisis or the rift, but the  
 
political leg of the GCC was badly affected for sure. 
 
How about the GCC inter-relations? 
 
          Relationship was not smooth during all of this period between Qatar and 3 states that  
 
recalled their ambassadors, and as a result, Qatar' s relationship with UAE, Bahrain and Saudi  
 
Arabia deteriorated, and Qatar was more and more in a position of isolation, it was isolated from  
 
many functions, from many meetings, and hence, I think the GCC was in general affected, but  
 
Qatar relationship with the three states that recalled their ambassadors was also affected, the two  
 
states relations that were affected were the UAE and Qatar, more than others. 
 
How do assess the Jeddah meeting? 
 
          It is a positive move, it moved the GCC integration away from a further deterioration, and  
 
it took away some of the tension, and de- escalated the bad feelings around, I think the GCC was  
 
heading towards  a clash of a sort, towards more deterioration, and the meeting in Jeddah just  
 
two or three days ago pulled everybody  back  away from the edge, and that's why  whatever  
 
happened there, it is positive. 
 
How do you see the future? 
 
          You know all integration experiences, and all integration processes throughout history go  
 
through difficulties, and I think  the GCC has definitely gone through one of these bad 
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experiences and  through one of these difficult  times ,  but I think the 33 years old Gulf  
 
cooperation and integration, coordination is still solid enough, I think it will continue, and I am  
 
sure probably a year from now will be able to go back to normal truck. 
 
GCC countries will be cautious? 
 
          There was a lesson for everybody, and the lesson was the bigger concern that being  
 
together is more important than going it alone, and sometimes you have to moderate your  
 
position, and sometimes you have to give up on your position, I think there is lesson learnt, and  
 
the lesson is that we are better off being of sticking together, we are better of thinking together,  
 
and are better of acting together, I think this lesson has been learnt  and may be everybody will  
 
try  go back to where they were prior to their call of the ambassadors. 
 
5 - Fahd Al Sumait 
 
Why the withdrawal? 
 
          This an attempt to exert some control on Qatar, unsuccessfully I may add, a very strong  
 
form of diplomacy, it is a strong message, in the end, one is left wondering whether it will  
 
actually have the major effect, with the Muslim brotherhood now, gone out of the Egyptian   
 
political system, we do not know how Egypt relationship will be Qatar. 
 
Do you think Egypt was behind this decision? 
 
          Yes, I will not be surprised, you know Egypt with its problems there is still an umbrella, it  
 
is a very important country for the region, I am sure Sissi was not happy with Qatar, it had  
 
something to do with encouraging the move, I think Saudi Arabia was the primary genesis for  
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that decision. 
 
What about The functioning of the GCC? 
 
          Let's say the GCC has been dysfunctional already, so I think it did not affect the  
 
functioning of this dysfunctional unit, a lot of the policies they work on is done by the  
 
technocrats, and not by the ambassadors for example , so in think in terms of functioning not  
 
that much, in terms of GCC interstate relations, I think it was a very strong message, I think  
 
Saudi Arabia was working to insert some kind of strong statement and control over Qatar. In  
 
terms of international relations, it will make Qatar more cautious about some of the international  
 
relations decisions that makes especially when it relate to the Muslim brother hood or the support  
 
of  incoming governments where had been revolutions. 
 
How do you see future? 
 
         I see the future of the GCC organization as the same as it is, something that will continue to  
 
maintain, it will serve mainly the interests of the rulers and no the people, and I do not think that  
 
this will change in the future as well. 
 
Do you want to add something? 
 
         I hope my prediction will be wrong; I would love to see the GCC starts implementing some  
 
policies for which the GCC should stand , they may not be able to go with an integrated  
 
economy, but certainly a better flow of people especially skilled labor, a better transfer of  
 
technology and innovation, integration of the transportation systems, integrated health system,  
 
there is a lot of potential, unified environment policies and 
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the list goes on and on. 
 
6 - David Goldfischer 
 
What is the reason of withdrawal? 
 
          The deepest immediate issue is the support of Qatar for the Muslim brotherhood that the  
 
UAE and Saudi Arabia believe that Muslim Brotherhood represents a direct threat to their own  
 
regimes. 
 
Did affect the GCC functioning? 
 
          Unfortunately, I think at this moment in the region in the wake of the Arab uprisings and  
 
the aftermath, there is a very fundamental division here of whether political Islam should be the  
 
future of the region or whether political Islam represents a danger, and this is a very deep  
 
division that unless one of the parties changes, I think it represents a deep rupture in the GCC. 
 
What are the effects on relations? 
 
          In light of the news, in Libya, the UAE has dropped bombs on an Islamist group that has  
 
been funded by the Qataris, it is almost like a proxy war, so I think at this moments and things  
 
are changing rapidly in the region, so it is very difficult to make predictions, so I think to talk  
 
about a common foreign policy of the GCC  is  simply not realistic. 
 
Did it create tensions? 
 
          Tensions have existed, the diplomatic rupture was .the tensions that have been simmering  
 
for a long time, and noticed only by people paying attention to the politics of the GCC  became  
 
visible. 
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Did it reduce Qatar diplomacy? 
 
          Considering the size of the country, and their tremendous exposure in an area of deep  
 
conflicts in the region, I assume that there some voices advising the Qataris to take a step back to  
 
begin to reappraise their strong engagement at the regional level. 
 
What do you think of the Qatari reaction? 
 
          The Qataris have been remarkable in terms of considering the size of their country, their  
 
profile and their ability to conduct conflict resolution negotiations recently involving Israel and  
 
Hamas, but I long recognize they have able to perform on regional and world stage and in an  
 
apparently effective way, the big question, however, concerns this particular division over the  
 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
How do you see future of the GCC? 
 
          I think the reality of meaning cooperation certainly security cooperation has been  
 
overshadowed by the security fundamental split over political Islam and its future role  in the  
 
region, so things are moving very quickly obviously the emergence of the Islamic states. I think  
 
the GCC cannot function as its supporters have hoped. 
 
7- Gerd Nonneman 
 
Why the withdrawal? 
 
          It was a reaction based on anger, annoyance or whatever irritation on part of some in the  
 
policy establishments in Riyadh and in Abu Dhabi with Bahrain tagging along, it over the Qatari  
 
foreign policy particularly over the different perceptions of what the Muslim brother represents  
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with Qatar, this is not a threat, a non-violent organization with a lot of support around the Arab  
 
world, and even if they made huge mistakes in Egypt and lost credibility, this does not mean that  
 
they suddenly became a terrorist threat, Qatar had been supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, not  
 
for ideologically reasons, but  as one of major players in the Arab spring, and as one of the  
 
likely winners, and that they won't suddenly to turn, to make a U turn, whereas in part of the  
 
Saudi policy making and in Abu Dhabi there was a complete turnaround in the perceptions of the  
 
Muslim brotherhood as a domestic and regional threat, it's because, back in decades, people at  
 
least with sympathizers of Muslim Brotherhood as an organization, as a body of thought were a  
 
very prominent threat in education and so on, they were  welcomed , and worked with the state  
 
administration, but because of changing  regional , some of the Saudi and Abu Dhabi  
 
establishment began to see them as a potential alternative for people, a potential alternative  
 
model for people as opposed to the models the Al Saud or Al Nahyan want to make people 
 
look to, it was an alternative model. Therefore, it represented a threat, plus they do not want this  
 
movement to become a pole of attraction by being in control of Egypt ,that ultimately what  
 
underlies the split , and Qatar was not  seen sufficiently sensitive to that, in addition they have  
 
Yusuf  Al Qardawi, and Aljazeera where a lot of people who have, lets to say sympathy with the  
 
Muslim Brotherhood or at least with the Egyptian opposition, so all of that led some people in  
 
Saudi Arabia and some in Abu Dhabi were concerned to show that Qatar was against Saudi and  
 
UAE interests, and there we are. 
 
Did it affect interstate relations and their foreign relations? 
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         It showed GCC weaker than they sometimes try to portrait themselves, there are clearly  
 
divisions which there were before, and now they are very apparent. in terms of foreign relations,  
 
of course it had an impact, because one of the things GCC is supposedly has been trying is to  
 
together as a coherent security actor and defend in terms of security of regional defense, it has  
 
not gone very far, we were getting  to a point where the Americans were getting increasingly  
 
concerned with trying to make the GCC into more cohesive defense  partner, taking their share in  
 
regional  
 
security responsibility them, if they want to supply them with a missile defense system  and so 
 
on, they want it to be done in a way that ,it was not just six little individual states without  
 
coordination, it need a regional based missile defense structure, with this rift happening, that  
 
kind of projects becomes more difficult in fact it becomes virtually impossible, in that sense,  
 
what happened, further stepped back the GCC unity, I won't have to say it. 
 
Did it affect the functioning of the GCC? 
 
          Of course at a high political level in terms of defense coordination and so on, but the  
 
interesting thing is that at a lower more technical cooperation level, a number of agencies    
 
whether it is about standards or customs discussions, a whole range of other things in the GCC  
 
continued all along. 
 
Do you think GCC countries will be more cautious? 
 
        There has never been, nor there is, nor ever be a common position for the whole GCC states  
 
on what the GCC should be, Oman thinks differently of what the GCC should become, Kuwait  
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thinks differently, Saudi Arabia thinks differently and Qatar thinks differently. I think all of them  
 
think it is worth maintaining something called GCC, and to develop different areas to get a better  
 
coordination especially when it comes to external defense for instance, and certainly when it  
 
comes to domestic economic integration, so I think that  will continue in one way or another , I  
 
cannot think for a moment that Qatar will be suspended from the GCC, because there is no 
 
support for that among all the GCC states, but in the meantime, it caused friction, it complicated  
 
coordination, but I expect that in the five years hence there still be a CCG, and aspects of its  
 
activities will be developing further, I don't expect anything like a gulf union, what happened last  
 
year made a true gulf union power less likely. 
 
8 - Leah Sherwood 
 
What is the reason behind the withdrawal? 
 
          One of the most prominent reasons probably relates to the activist foreign policy that Qatar  
 
has had, and Riyadh and the perception from the other gulf countries in terms of what is the  
 
motivation of Qatar, it seems to be deviating from the  GCC's collective stance. Although they  
 
have independent foreign policies, there was a perception that Qatar was acting against the  
 
interests of the GCC alliance particularly upsetting the hegemone Saudi Arabia and its interests. 
 
What about Qatar reaction? 
 
          I think, it is always done that way, the GCC and Arabs in general, they conduct business  
 
quietly, they do not publicize, and make general statements, you do not know what happened in  
 
these meetings except for the media statement at the end , I think what they did was just perhaps   
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to mitigate the damage, not to enflame the situation, to try to maintain calm, and not necessarily  
 
irritate the other members by repeating what was said, and it is the practice to do politically and  
 
culturally. 
 
How about the functioning of the GCC? 
 
          I think it is a contributing factor to some of the functions; however the GCC has never  
 
a unified front politically, economically, certainly militarily so this does not break something that   
 
already broken or perhaps was never made in the first place, but in terms of the integration  
 
projects and the hopes of what the GCC could become this is not a positive development , and I  
 
think with some diplomacy and some care, I think they can overcome this, and perhaps the UAE  
 
will consider resending their ambassador may be in the new  year. 
 
9 - Hussain Jassim 
 
Why the withdrawal happened? 
 
          There are differences in foreign policies objectives; I believe the case will be resolved in a  
 
one way or another, this cannot go on, it is very bad for the GCC as a whole, the GCC image, for  
 
the idea of having a GCC union, I expect this is going to be addressed. 
 
Was there any foreign factor, Egypt for instance? 
 
          Foreign policy is the broad; the details are Egypt, Syria and Libya. Generally, different  
 
views related to foreign relations objectives. 
 
How do you see the future of the organization? 
 
          The GCC will remain, it is a very important part of the world, very rich in terms of money,  
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in terms of oil and gas .They have to find a way, there is a need for compromise, all sides have to  
 
sit together and find a way out. 
 
Last word? 
 
          They have to find a solution, there is no need for having this kind of problem, the GCC has  
 
very important things, there are a lot of issues, very important ones, challenges, regional, 
 
international, so there is no point going into something relatively minor. 
 
10 - J.Marc Rickli 
 
           There is a very different vision in the gulf about political Islam between Qatar and a group  
 
of three countries Bahrain, UAE and Saudi Arabia, I think these three countries believe that  
 
political Islam is a direct threat to the survival of the regime. Qatar has welcomed these people  
 
since the 70's, and is much open to integrate them, and therefore, does see them as a threat to for  
 
such, so I think it's an issue of survival, regime survival. 
 
Do you the change of regime in Egypt has a link with the incident? 
 
          Definitely, we are talking about the same people it is about Muslim brotherhood, the fact  
 
that Morsi was in power with also Qatar, it was for the three other countries that signaled the  
 
spread of political Islam ideology which, if reaches the gulf will destabilize. 
 
Did the move affect the GCC functioning? 
 
         Yes because the GCC is the alliance of six countries, and they are spending more time in  
 
dealing with internal issues instead of external issues. 
 
What about Qatar reaction and mediation? 
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          Kuwait and Oman especially Kuwait realized the GCC risks dissolution that's why they  
 
had to do something, the position of Qatar they chose to keep quiet and wait the time passes so to  
 
solve the issue. The group of three states is aggressive against one, for the political opinion, it is  
 
never that good, it is very difficult to assess. 
 
What about inter-state and foreign relations? 
 
Qatar has become less active in terms of foreign policy, the foreign policy has been reduced. 
 
Will GCC countries be more cautious? 
 
          Probably yes, though I do not think that they will change its foreign policy orientation  
 
dramatically, they may less vocal, but I think the shadow diplomacy  may continue support a  
 
some kind of orientation. 
 
11 - Said al Saqri 
 
Why the withdrawal? 
 
          It is a power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Qatar wants to have some sort of  
 
self identity, it wants to reassert itself as an independent strong power with a will to be on its  
 
own, and at the same time Saudi Arabia is a big country, does want to be bullied by a small  
 
country like Qatar, and it just happened that the UAE and Saudi Arabia happened to have an  
 
interest together in actually fighting the Islamic Brotherhood, they went into the conflict and  
 
resulting in pulling the ambassadors from Qatar. 
 
Was Egypt a cause of this rift? 
 
          I think the fear for Saudi Arabia and other gulf countries is that there is an increasing Shia  
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power in the region, and it will be coming in all sorts of form through many different countries, it  
 
was in their interest to ally themselves with an opposing power, it happened also that the Islamic  
 
Brotherhood as power is increasing, and they no longer see them as a balancing power against  
 
the Shia or the Iranian hegemony. In fact, they feel threatened by them Saudi Arabia and the  
 
UAE that's why they have been against the Islamic brotherhood and against Qatar, if  
 
Brotherhood arrives to power, this is a threat against the status quo and the current system in the  
 
area. 
 
What about Qatar reaction and mediation? 
 
         Qatar has to be very careful, besides the historical and other interests that it has with  
 
countries like Saudi Arabia, it is its gateway to the rest of the Arabian peninsula, so it has to be  
 
very careful, and it is a big neighbor as well, Saudi Arabia can easily bully Qatar, it is huge, and  
 
Qatar has very small population, so it has to play its card very calmly 
 
Did it affect the GCC functioning? 
 
          The rift must have affected the interests of the GCC, there is no institutional mechanism in  
 
place to protect that cooperation, it is in the mercy of how the leadership in each country feels ,  
 
and if it feels it does not want to extend their relationship any more, if there are any issues or  
 
difference between them, they can soar the relationship ,and that's what really happened. 
 
Has Qatar remained dynamic? 
 
         Internationally, I think Qatar is still dynamic, I watch Aljazeera, and I see it very critical of  
 
Egypt, it is very much behind the earlier regime, the Islamic Brotherhood, Qatar is asserting its  
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independence from Saudi Arabia, and as long as it has the financial power, I think  it will try to  
 
play that game , I think Saudi Arabia in the long run has its own problems, so I think they are  
 
basically looking at the long term, and ultimately  Saudi Arabia will be able to bully them  
 
forever. 
 
How do you see the future of GCC? 
 
         I think it will be there, but we are not going to see united GCC countries, we are not to see  
 
further consolidation into becoming really an economic power and a political power in the  
 
region. 
 
You want to add something? 
 
          If you look at the relationship between the different GCC countries, the way they have  
 
developed, you have got Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand ,you have got Oman and  
 
Kuwait that try to play some sort to be in the middle, and you have got Qatar on the other hand.  
 
Basically, the role of Oman and Kuwait are going to play, is the only reason for the GCC will  
 
function and will hold for some time, but I don't think it is an effective group of countries, I don't  
 
see it playing a greater role in terms of becoming a real super power in the region , becoming a  
 
real economic unity, becoming a real political unity certainly.  
 
